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To Be or Not to Be Both CEO and 
Board Chair* 
Thuy-Nga T. Vo† 
The top two leadership roles in the American 
corporation are the chief executive officer (“CEO”) and the 
chairperson of the board of directors (“Chair”).1 There is a large 
body of literature that examines the impact of the CEO’s 
compensation and stock ownership on the company’s 
performance. Much has also been written about the effects of 
the board’s size, director stock ownership, and director 
independence on the company’s success. Less attention has 
been given to the governance structure in which both the CEO 
and Chair positions are held by one individual and the impact 
of this dual leadership role—commonly known as “duality”2—on 
the corporation’s performance.  
Thus far, the limited scholarship on duality takes two 
different analytical approaches: the theoretical underpinning of 
duality or the empirical effect of duality on discrete 
performance variables. Legal scholarship focuses primarily on 
theoretical concepts (e.g., conflicts of interests, entrenchment, 
and agency costs) to evaluate the different leadership 
structures of corporate entities. Literature in the areas of 
management, business, and financial economics, by contrast, 
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 1 See J. Richard Harrison, David L. Torres & Sal Kukalis, The Changing of 
the Guard: Turnover and Structural Change in the Top-Management Positions, 33 
ADMIN. SCI. Q. 211, 211, 221-23 (1988) (arguing that although the CEO and Chair are 
both at the top of the corporate leadership hierarchy, the CEO has greater power 
relative to the Chair). 
 2 See B. Ram Baliga, R. Charles Moyer & Ramesh S. Rao, CEO Duality and 
Firm Performance: What’s the Fuss?, 17 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 41, 42 (1996) (“In cases of 
CEO duality, the CEO of the firm wears two hats—a CEO hat and a chairperson of the 
board of directors hat. Nonduality implies that different individuals serve as the CEO 
and the chairperson.”). 
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focuses mostly on results from empirical tests of discrete 
measures (e.g., executive compensation, management turnover, 
and stock returns) to evaluate the different corporate 
leadership structures.  
The pervasiveness of duality in corporate America 
underlies the importance of understanding this leadership 
structure and its impact on corporate performance. This article 
analyzes the impact of duality on corporate performance 
through an integrated framework, using concepts from legal 
scholarship in addition to data from management, business, 
and financial literature. Using these theoretical concepts and 
empirical results, this article analyzes whether the 
combination or separation of the top leadership roles better 
supports the foundational concept of corporate governance: 
directors are responsible for overseeing business operations 
and monitoring management to achieve corporate financial 
success.3 
Part I of this article discusses the management and 
monitoring responsibilities of the board of directors. Part II 
explores the duality governance structure and its prevalence in 
corporate America. In Part III, the article examines and weighs 
the theoretical arguments for and against duality. Based on 
these arguments, this part assesses the impact of combined or 
separate CEO and Chair positions on the board’s performance 
of its management and monitoring responsibilities. Part IV 
turns to the empirical data on the effect of combined, rather 
than separate, CEO-Chair roles on corporate performance. Part 
V explains the views of corporate stakeholders on the duality 
  
 3 See AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 3.01 cmt. a (1994) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES]. Comment (a) to 
section 3.01 quotes the Corporate Director’s Guidebook, which states: 
Even under statutes providing that the business and affairs shall be 
“managed” by the board of directors, it is recognized that actual operation is a 
function of management. The responsibility of the board is limited to 
overseeing such operation. . . . It is important to emphasize that the role of 
the director is to monitor, in an environment of loyal but independent 
oversight, the conduct of the business and affairs of the corporation in behalf 
of those who invest in the corporation. 
Id.; see also ERIC A. CHIAPPINELLI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES 379 
(2006) (“One obvious consequence of a person’s agreement to serve as a director is the 
understanding that he or she will strive for the corporation’s financial success.”); Paul 
Mallette & Karen L. Fowler, Effects of Board Composition and Stock Ownership on the 
Adoption of “Poison Pills”, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1010, 1012 (1992) (“[I]t is widely 
accepted that boards are the formal representatives of firms’ shareholders and that 
they exist to monitor top management performance and protect shareholders’ rights 
and interests.”). 
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debate. The article concludes that theoretical arguments and 
empirical evidence, as reflected in financial and nonfinancial 
metrics, strongly suggest that a corporate governance structure 
with a nonexecutive Chair, instead of a dual CEO-Chair, is 
better suited to the fulfillment of the directors’ fundamental 
responsibilities to oversee business operations and monitor 
management for the purpose of enhancing shareholder value.  
I. BOARD OF DIRECTORS’ AUTHORITY TO GOVERN 
A. Management and Monitoring Roles 
State statutes provide the board of directors with the 
authority to manage and direct the operation of the 
corporation.4 The board’s management role requires directors to 
set enterprise policies and to make key business decisions 
involving matters such as financing plans, growth strategies, 
and executive compensation.5 The board’s monitoring role, on 
the other hand, entails hiring management personnel to 
operate the business and overseeing management to control 
weak performances or self-serving action by corporate 
managers.6 
Both the management and monitoring roles encompass 
specific tasks, and it is not always easy or necessary to 
determine whether a task is more in the line of managing or 
monitoring.7 For example, a board deciding whether to approve 
  
 4 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001 & Supp. 2008) (“The business and 
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under 
the direction of the board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01 (2008) 
(“[T]he business and affairs of the corporation shall be managed by or under the 
direction, and subject to the oversight, of its board of directors . . . .”). 
 5 Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence 
Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370, 381 (2002); Robert Charles Clark, Corporate 
Governance Changes in the Wake of the Sarbanes Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for 
Policymakers Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 279 (2005); R. William Ide, Post-Enron 
Corporate Governance Opportunities: Creating a Culture of Greater Board 
Collaboration and Oversight, 54 MERCER L. REV. 829, 836 (2003). 
 6 Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 381; Clark, supra note 5, at 278; Melvin A. 
Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1278 (1999); 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: 
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007); Ide, 
supra note 5, at 836, 838; Idalene F. Kesner, Bart Victor & Bruce T. Lamont, Board 
Composition and the Commission of Illegal Acts: An Investigation of Fortune 500 
Companies, 29 ACAD. MGMT. J. 789, 790 (1986).  
 7 See Joel Seligman, No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate and 
Securities Law After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 457-62 (2002) (distinguishing the 
board’s management function in approving the company’s special purpose vehicles from 
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a material transaction with an inside executive is exercising 
not only its management role of making a fundamental 
business decision, but also its oversight role of ensuring that 
the transaction enhances shareholder value instead of merely 
furthering executive interests.  
There has been vigorous debate over whether the 
board’s primary role is to manage or to monitor.8 It is well 
settled, though, that a board may delegate its management 
authority to corporate officers,9 and that such delegation is now 
the norm in corporate America.10 It is the officers who in fact 
manage most public corporations on a day-to-day basis.11 
Having delegated the daily management function to the 
executives, directors retain oversight responsibility in order to 
  
the board’s monitoring function over the CFO’s conflicts of interest in proposing and 
operating the special purpose vehicles). 
 8 See FRANKLIN GEVURTZ, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CORPORATE LAW 68 (2006) 
(observing that many commentators believe the board’s primary role is “to monitor 
management, rather than . . . manage the corporation”); Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 
378 (recounting that the American Law Institute’s first draft of its Principles of 
Corporate Governance generated the “hotly debated . . . issue of what role the board of 
directors . . . should play in corporate governance”). 
 9 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 142(a)-(b) (West 2010) (“Every corporation 
organized under this chapter shall have such officers with such titles and duties as 
shall be stated in the bylaws or in a resolution of the board of directors which is not 
inconsistent with the bylaws . . . . Officers shall be chosen in such manner and shall 
hold their offices for such terms as are prescribed by the laws or determined by the 
board of directors . . . .”); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.40 (2008) (“The board of directors 
may elect individuals to fill one or more offices of the corporation . . . .”); id. § 8.41 
(“Each officer has the authority and shall perform the functions set forth in the bylaws 
or, to the extent consistent with the bylaws, the functions prescribed by the board of 
directors . . . .”).  
 10 See Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 1278-81 (explaining that the management 
role was dominant more than twenty years ago, but the monitoring role has now been 
recognized as the primary function of the board); Ide, supra note 5, at 836 (observing 
that the monitoring role was less recognized than the management role until post-
Enron); ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 3.02 cmt. d (“In the publicly held corporation, 
the management function is normally vested in the principal senior executives.”). 
 11 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 3.01 cmt. a (quoting the Corporate 
Director’s Guidebook, which states, “It is generally recognized that the board of 
directors is not expected to operate the business . . . . [I]t is recognized that actual 
operation is a function of management. The responsibility of the board is limited to 
overseeing such operation.”); id. § 3.02 cmt. d (“A basic function of the board is to select 
these executives and to oversee their performance (using the term ‘oversee’ to refer to 
general observation and oversight, not active supervision or day-to-day scrutiny) to 
determine whether the business is being properly managed . . . .”); Lynn A. Stout, On 
the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo 
Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 18 (2003) (explaining that after 
directors select executives and employees to run daily operations, the directors 
intervene in daily operations only on major issues).  
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ensure that the executives’ actions advance the company’s 
business and financial objectives.12 
B. Independence Requirements  
To facilitate the board’s monitoring function, federal 
laws and stock exchange listing standards require certain 
levels of director independence.13 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 requires public companies to have an audit committee 
composed entirely of independent directors.14 Similarly, the 
listing standards of the New York Stock Exchange15 and the 
Nasdaq Stock Market16 require public companies to have a 
  
 12 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 3.01 cmt. a. Specifically, comment (a) 
to section 3.01, quoting the Business Roundtable Statement, states that  
Although the board cannot effectively conduct day-to-day operations, the 
board does have a major role in, and a major accountability for, the financial 
performance of the enterprise. This clearly requires a continuing check on 
corporate financial results and prospects, including profit and loss and cash 
flow by major business segments. 
Id.; see also Stout, supra note 11, at 18 (“Just as a smoke detector may seem an idle 
lump of plastic and metal until an actual fire, a board of directors that appears passive 
most of the time can save shareholders billions of dollars, if it notices and reacts when 
things go wrong.”). 
 13 See Gordon, supra note 6, at 1477-83 (discussing the evolution of the 
director independence rules). 
 14 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(3)(A) (2006). Being 
“independent” means the audit committee member may not be an affiliate of the 
company and may not receive fees from the company, other than fees for service on the 
board or board committees. Id. § 78j-1(m)(3)(B). An “affiliate” of the company is a 
person controlling, controlled by, or “under common control with” the company. 17 
C.F.R. § 240.10A-3(e)(1)(i) (2010). Having “control” means having the “power to direct 
or cause the direction of the management and policies of” the company “through the 
ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise.” Id. § 240.10A-3(e)(4). 
 15 N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FINAL NYSE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RULES 4-10 
(2003), available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf. Under NYSE 
requirements, a director is not independent if the director receives compensation of 
“more than $100,000 per year” from the NYSE company, other than board fees, or if 
the director is an executive officer of another company that is doing business with the 
NYSE company in excess of the “greater of $1 million or 2% of such other company’s 
consolidated gross revenues.” Id. In addition, a director is not considered independent 
“unless the board of directors affirmatively determines that the director has no 
material relationships with the listed company,” whether in the nature of commercial, 
industrial, banking, consulting, legal, accounting, charitable, or familial relationships. 
Id. Material relationships may occur directly between the director and the company, or 
indirectly through the director being a “partner, shareholder or officer of an 
organization that has a relationship with the company.” Id. 
 16 Developments in the Law—Corporations and Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2169, 2187, 2191, 2193 (2004) [hereinafter Developments]. Nasdaq’s standards for 
director independence are similar to the NYSE standards discussed above, but 
Nasdaq’s cut-off for non-board-related compensation is $60,000 per year, and the cut-
off for the director’s business payments to or income from the company is the greater of 
$200,000 or “5% of the recipient’s consolidated gross revenues.” Id. at 2189-90. 
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majority of independent directors on their boards and to have 
the entire nominating, compensation, and audit committees 
composed of independent directors. 
The director independence requirement is grounded in 
the belief that outside directors are more effective than inside 
directors in monitoring management conduct.17 Opinions and 
research findings, however, are mixed on the value of director 
independence.18 There is evidence that director independence 
enhances, detracts from, or has no effect on corporate 
performance, in both financial and nonfinancial measures.19 For 
example, some studies find that outside directors negatively 
affect corporate performance because the outside directors are 
more likely to support management prerogatives than 
shareholder interests, that increasing outsider representation 
reduces research and development spending, and that an 
outsider-dominated board is more likely to award “golden 
parachutes” to the company’s executives.20 
Other studies, on the other hand, find that increasing 
outsider representation on the board improves corporate 
  
 17 Gordon, supra note 6, at 1468-69; see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, 
§ 3A.01 cmt. c (“The effectiveness of the oversight function is conditioned on two 
prerequisites: a board that can objectively evaluate the performance of the senior 
executives, and an accurate and reliable flow of information to the board concerning 
that performance.”).  
 18 Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between 
Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921, 924, 942 (1999); Victor 
Brudney, The Independent Director—Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. 
REV. 597, 635 (1982); Developments, supra note 16, at 2200; Gordon, supra note 6, at 
1500-09; Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, at 1013; Dan L. Worrell, Carol Nemec & 
Wallace N. Davidson III, One Hat Too Many: Key Executive Plurality and Shareholder 
Wealth, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 499, 501 (1997). 
 19 Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 386-88; Clark, supra note 5, at 298-301 
(summarizing studies showing positive, negative, and nominal impact of director 
independence on “firm profitability or performance”); Gordon, supra note 6, at 1468 
(“One of the apparent puzzles in the empirical corporate governance literature is the 
lack of correlation between the presence of independent directors and the firm’s 
economic performance.”); Worrell et al., supra note 18, at 501 (noting that the presence 
of outside directors may lead to “positive stock price reactions” and a positive 
correlation between outsider presence and “bidding firms’ stock returns in 
acquisitions”).  
 20 Chamu Sundaramurthy, James M. Mahoney & Joseph T. Mahoney, Board 
Structure, Antitakeover Provisions, and Stockholder Wealth, 18 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 
231, 240 (1997); see also Worrell et al., supra note 18, at 501 (“[O]utside directors are 
often chosen by the CEO and may be aligned to management interests.”). “Golden 
parachutes” are compensation arrangements “that allow covered managers to 
voluntarily resign and collect substantial remuneration—in some cases several million 
dollars—after a triggering event, usually a hostile takeover.” Philip L. Cochran, Robert 
A. Wood & Thomas B. Jones, The Composition of Boards of Directors and Incidence of 
Golden Parachutes, 28 ACAD. MGMT. J. 664, 664-65 (1985). 
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performance in financial accounting measures and stock price.21 
Moreover, empirical research indicates that an independent 
board is more likely to terminate a CEO after a period of poor 
financial performance.22 An independent board may also 
enhance shareholder value by reducing the likelihood that 
shareholders will bring suits against the company and that the 
board will approve greenmail payments.23 
Given the mixed results in the correlation between 
director independence and corporate performance, the question 
of whether, and what portion of, the board should be composed 
of independent directors has been a subject of contention.24 This 
article explores a specific angle of the director independence 
question: whether corporations should separate the positions of 
CEO and board Chair so that each position is held by a 
different individual.25 Thus, the focus of this article is the 
independence of the chairperson of the board—not the 
independence of directors generally.  
  
 21 James P. Walsh & James K. Seward, On the Efficiency of Internal and 
External Corporate Control Mechanisms, 15 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 421, 433 (1990); Worrell 
et al., supra note 18, at 501. 
 22 Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 433. 
 23 Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, 1013; Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 
20, at 240; Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 433. The corporate practice of paying a 
premium price to repurchase shares in order to be rid of a hostile shareholder is known 
as paying “greenmail” to the hostile shareholder. CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 244. 
 24 See Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 386-88 (questioning the effect of director 
independence on corporate performance); Clark, supra note 5, at 298-301 (counseling 
against “one-size-fits-all governmental mandates” that impose director independence 
requirements on corporations); Thuy-Nga T. Vo, Rating Management Behavior and 
Ethics: A Proposal to Upgrade the Corporate Governance Rating Criteria, 34 J. CORP. L. 
1, 12 (2008) (discussing the emphasis that governance rating agencies place on director 
independence). 
 25 This article focuses on whether the board Chair should currently serve as 
the company’s CEO. Some proponents of separating the positions would prohibit not 
only the current CEO, but also former CEOs of the company, from serving as board 
Chairs. Clark, supra note 5, at 271. Other observers see a benefit in having a retired 
CEO assume the Chair position; putting the retired CEO on the board retains the 
company-specific knowledge valuable to the Chair’s job. James A. Brickley, Jeffrey L. 
Coles & Gregg Jarrell, Leadership Structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the 
Board, 3 J. CORP. FIN. 189, 194-95 (1997). Yet others believe that the board should 
have a Chair who fully satisfies the independence requirements under regulatory and 
listing standards. See Steven Balsam & Arun Upadhyay, Impact of Board Leadership 
on Firm Performance: Does It Matter Who Heads the Board? 21 (Mar. 16, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1361255 (“[T]he benefits of having a separate 
chair . . . appear to only exist when that chair is an independent director.”). 
72 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
C. Responsibility to Further Shareholder Interests 
Underlying the board’s authority to govern is its 
responsibility to strive for the corporation’s success, whether 
determined by financial profitability or other indices of 
performance.26 There has been lively discussion about whether 
directors, when making decisions for the corporation, should 
consider shareholder interests alone or whether they should 
also consider the interests of other stakeholders27 of the 
corporation.28 Although this debate continues, after the 
appearance of constituency statutes in the 1980s, it became 
generally acknowledged that directors may consider various 
constituents’ interests in making corporate decisions.29 
Although directors may consider other stakeholders’ interests, 
and corporate success may be measured in terms other than 
financial metrics, a fundamental tenet of corporate law is that 
the board is charged with management and monitoring 
responsibilities to ensure that corporate actions serve 
shareholder best interests and maximize shareholder wealth.30 
  
 26 See Ide, supra note 5, at 837-38 (stating that the board’s role to monitor 
corporate performance includes not only confirming that the company is meeting its 
financial goals but also that the company is achieving legal and regulatory compliance 
and human resources management); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 423 (explaining 
that measures of corporate performance may include market value, employee turnover, 
employee satisfaction, and corporate involvement in illegal activities). 
 27 See infra Part V for the definition of “stakeholders.”  
 28 See generally William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the 
Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 262-81 (1992) (discussing the 
inconsistent conceptions of the corporation as “shareholder property” and “social 
entity”); Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values 
and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 686-721 (2004) (explaining the debate 
over whether corporate fiduciaries should maximize the interests of shareholders alone 
or of stakeholders as a group); see also Brudney, supra note 18, at 602-07 (identifying 
the debate on whether directors should serve stockholders or other nonstockholder 
constituencies); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 422-23 (distinguishing between the 
general view in the field of financial economics that shareholder interests are primary 
in corporate decisions and the general view in the field of organizational theory that 
the interests of many stakeholders are considered in corporate decisions).  
 29 See, e.g., Allen, supra note 28, at 279-81 (explaining that this conceptual 
battle was won in the late 1980s with the endorsement of the entity theory, but 
suggesting that the war was far from over); Brudney, supra note 18, at 604-05 (“[A]ll—
except the most devout free market economists—embrace the notion of some social 
responsibility . . . . [However,] there is a wide range of views about how much social 
responsibility is enough.”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical 
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 634 
(1992) (explaining that constituency statutes permit directors to consider the effects of 
corporate action on constituent groups). 
 30 Katherine M. Brown, New Demands, Better Boards: Rethinking Director 
Compensation in an Era of Heightened Corporate Governance, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1102, 
1106 (2007); Brudney, supra note 18, at 602; Gordon, supra note 6, at 1471-72; Mallette 
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II. CURRENT STATUS OF DUALITY 
The term “duality” describes the corporate leadership 
structure where one individual holds both the CEO and Chair 
positions.31 Although duality is pervasive in corporate America, 
it is less popular32—or even prohibited33—in other countries. 
Duality has been the dominant corporate governance 
structure in the United States.34 According to the 1989 Forbes 
  
& Fowler, supra note 3, at 1012; Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active 
Board of Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 1283, 1283 (1998); see also ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 3.01 cmt. a 
(quoting the Corporate Director’s Guidebook that “[i]t is important to emphasize that 
the role of the director is to monitor, in an environment of loyal but independent 
oversight, the conduct of the business and affairs of the corporation in behalf of those 
who invest in the corporation.”); Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” 
During the 2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 5-9 
(2009) (discussing the evolution of corporate governance from the managerial 
capitalism model in post-World War II to the shareholder value model in the 1980s). 
 31 See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42 (“In cases of CEO duality, the CEO of 
the firm wears two hats—a CEO hat and a chairperson of the board of directors hat. 
Nonduality implies that different individuals serve as the CEO and the chairperson.”); 
Brian K. Boyd, CEO Duality and Firm Performance: A Contingency Model, 16 
STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 301, 301 (1995) (“CEO duality exists when a firm’s chief executive 
also serves as Chairman of the board of directors. Otherwise, the board is described as 
having an independent structure.”); Wm. Gerard Sanders & Mason A. Carpenter, 
Internationalization and Firm Governance: The Roles of CEO Compensation, Top Team 
Composition, and Board Structure, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 158, 164 (1998) (“Duality 
describes the situation in which an executive holds both the CEO and chairperson of 
the board positions.”). A small number of scholars do not use the term “duality” to 
specify the number of positions that the CEO holds, but instead use the term to refer to 
how many leaders the company has. Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 192. Under that 
definition, a unitary leadership structure signifies that there is one individual serving 
as both CEO and Chair, and a dual leadership structure refers to two separate people 
serving as CEO and Chair. Id.  
 32 See Dan R. Dalton & Idalene F. Kesner, Composition and CEO Duality in 
Boards of Directors: An International Perspective, 18 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 33, 39 (1987) 
(finding that duality is the governance structure for 82% of large corporations in the 
United States, 30% of large corporations in the United Kingdom, and 10.9% of large 
corporations in Japan); MILLSTEIN CTR. FOR CORP. GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE, 
CHAIRING THE BOARD: THE CASE FOR INDEPENDENT LEADERSHIP IN CORPORATE NORTH 
AMERICA 17 (2009) [hereinafter MILLSTEIN REPORT], available at http://www.cii.org/User 
Files/file/Millstein%20Center%20Rpt%20-%20Chairing%20the%20Board%203-15-09.pdf 
(stating that most public companies in Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Singapore, 
and the United Kingdom have a nonexecutive Chair); Richard W. Stevenson, Balancing 
the Power at the Corporate Top, British Style, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1992, at A4 (reporting 
that only 24% of public companies in Britain have duality and that the practice of having 
an independent director is common in Britain). 
 33 See MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 17 (explaining that Germany and 
Holland’s requirement of a two-tier board structure by definition separates the CEO 
and Chair positions, and South Africa’s Johannesburg Stock Exchange requires listed 
companies to split the positions); Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164 n.7 
(noting that some countries’ regulation of board structure results in the lack of 
consolidation of the CEO and Chair positions). 
 34 Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164; Stevenson, supra note 32. 
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Executive Compensation Survey, out of 661 large U.S. firms, 
approximately 81% of the companies maintained a leadership 
structure where one individual held both the CEO and Chair 
titles; approximately 14% of the companies had different people 
in the two positions; and approximately 5% of the companies 
did not have a Chair position.35 In 1992, the New York Times 
reported that 75% to 80% of companies had one executive who 
occupied both the CEO and Chair positions.36 Similarly, a 1992 
survey by executive firm Korn Ferry International affirmed 
that only 20% of the 1,000 largest corporations in America had 
a board Chair who did not also serve as the company’s CEO.37 
Although duality remains the most popular corporate 
leadership structure in the United States, the proportion of 
companies with duality has decreased in recent years. 
According to a study of the 1,500 companies in the ExecuComp 
database during the period from 1996 to 2005, the percentage 
of companies with a combined CEO-Chair steadily decreased 
from 76% in 1996 to 69% in 2000 and 60% in 2005.38 
Conversely, the proportion of companies with a separate board 
Chair steadily increased in that same ten-year period: 24% in 
1996, 31% in 2000, and 40% in 2005.39 In its 2009 board 
practices study, RiskMetrics Group, a provider of corporate 
governance services, reported that 46% of Standard & Poor’s 
1,500 companies had separate individuals serving in the CEO 
and Chair positions.40 
Only a small percentage of the separate board Chairs 
are independent directors, but that percentage has also 
increased in recent years.41 Prior to 2002, less than 25% of the 
companies that separated the CEO and Chair positions had an 
independent director who served as board Chair.42 By 2005, 
more than 31% of companies that separated the two roles had 
an independent director serve as board Chair.43 Almost half of 
  
 35 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 197-98.  
 36 Stevenson, supra note 32. 
 37 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43. 
 38 Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 38-39 (all figures have been rounded). 
 39 Id. (all figures have been rounded). 
 40 Press Release, RiskMetrics Grp., RiskMetrics Group Releases 2009 Board 
Practices Study (Jan. 8, 2009), http://www.riskmetrics.com/press/2009bp [hereinafter 
RiskMetrics Press Release]. 
 41 See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 39 (identifying the distribution 
of leadership structure). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id.  
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the individuals serving as separate Chairs were independent 
directors as of 2009.44 
Many companies that do not separate their CEO and 
Chair positions appoint a presiding director, commonly known 
as a “lead director,” to address conflicts of interest and agency-
cost concerns that are inherent in duality.45 The lead director’s 
job is to advise the CEO-Chair on selecting board committee 
members and setting board meeting agendas.46 The lead 
director also presides over executive sessions of independent 
directors.47  
Similar to the increase in the number of companies that 
have a separate board Chair, there has been an increase in the 
number of companies that have appointed a lead director to 
work with the individual who serves as both CEO and Chair.48 
Of the companies that combined the CEO and Chair positions, 
less than 1% had a lead director in 1996, while almost 4% had 
a lead director in 2000.49 By 2005, almost 68% of the companies 
that had a combined CEO-Chair also had a lead director.50 
Some corporate governance observers regard the 
presence of a lead director as an acceptable and effective 
alternative to having a separate board Chair.51 Other 
commentators, however, view the appointment of a lead 
director as a mere symbolic gesture, rather than an actual 
attempt to preserve board independence.52 Skeptics see the lead 
  
 44 RiskMetrics Press Release, supra note 40. 
 45 Jay W. Lorsch & Martin Lipton, On the Leading Edge: The Lead Director, 
71 HARV. BUS. REV. 79, 79-80 (1993) (recommending that companies with duality 
designate one of the outside directors as the lead director because “[e]ffective 
leadership of the outside directors is essential to enable the board to discharge its 
monitoring function properly”); Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1287-88. See 
Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 8 (“Appointing a lead director could be 
considered a compromise leadership structure, one that firms might adopt if they feel 
having a separate chair is too costly.”). 
 46 Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 8; Lorsch & Lipton, supra note 45, 
at 79. The CEO-Chair retains the power to appoint committee members and to set 
meeting agendas; the lead director, where there is one, provides input and suggestions 
to the CEO-Chair in connection with those tasks. Id. 
 47 Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 55; Clark, supra note 5, at 271. The 
lead director does not preside at meetings of the entire board and meetings of 
shareholders. Lorsch & Lipton, supra note 45, at 79. 
 48 Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 16. 
 49 See id. at 39 (identifying five lead directors in 595 duality companies in 
1996 and twenty lead directors in 542 duality companies in 2000).  
 50 See id. (identifying 405 lead directors in 596 duality companies in 2005). 
 51 Christopher Caggiano, Call Grows for Separation of CEO and Chairman 
Roles, 231 N.Y. L.J. 5, 5 (2004); Clark, supra note 5, at 271; Gordon, supra note 6, at 1495. 
 52 See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 4 (“[W]e find the existence of a 
lead director either has no effect or is negatively associated with firm performance. 
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director’s presence as inadequate to resolve the conflicts of 
interest in duality, pointing to the lead director’s consultative 
rather than authoritative role, lack of power to set the board 
agenda, and lack of authority to act as the spokesperson for the 
company.53 There has not been much empirical research on the 
effect of having a lead director in the corporate governance 
structure, but one study appears to support the view that the 
presence of a lead director does not enhance board performance 
or company profitability.54 
There is disagreement regarding the causes and 
consequences of a company’s top-leadership structure. Why do 
firms choose duality for their system of governance, and what 
effect does that structure have on company performance? 
Supporters explain duality’s persistent prevalence as evidence 
of its superiority as a governance structure in the competitive 
marketplace.55 As this argument goes, duality is the dominant 
leadership structure because corporate boards have determined 
that their CEOs have the knowledge and skills to lead both the 
board and the management group,56 or because the boards have 
given the title of board Chair as an award to the CEO who has 
led the company to successful performance.57 Advocates of a 
combined CEO-Chair also contend that duality remains 
  
This finding is consistent with firms appointing lead directors for symbolic rather than 
substantive purposes.”); MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 9 (“[T]he lead director is 
not perceived by . . . fellow board members as the board leader when in the shadow of 
the combined CEO and chairman.”). 
 53 See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 8 (“The difference between having a 
separate chair and having a lead director is that the former is nominally the head of the 
board which has supervisory authority over the CEO, whereas the latter’s role is normally 
more limited.”); Lorsch & Lipton, supra note 45, at 79 (recommending the appointment of a 
lead director for consultative and coordinative purposes, and specifying that the lead 
director will “not set the agenda nor preside at meetings” nor “act as a spokesperson for the 
company”); MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 8 (“The lead director does not run the 
meeting. He who sits at the head of the table runs the meeting.”). 
 54 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 55 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43; Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 199-200.  
 56 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43. 
 57 See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 192, 207 (explaining that most 
companies that have separate CEOs and Chairs are in a transitional succession 
process of testing new CEOs who would eventually be granted the Chair title); 
Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 226-27, 230 (suggesting that successful corporate 
financial performance is likely to enhance the power of the CEO and may result in the 
CEO being able to acquire the role of board Chair). Some candidates for the CEO 
position in fact demand that they get the Chair seat along with the top executive spot. 
Joann S. Lublin, Splitting Posts of Chairman, CEO Catches On, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 
2002, at B1. 
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dominant because it is effective in generating shareholder 
wealth.58 
Advocates of separate CEO and Chair positions, by 
contrast, attribute the pervasiveness of duality not to 
competitiveness or effectiveness, but instead to the shift toward 
a governance structure of “CEO primacy” or “dictatorship of the 
CEO,”59 and to the undue influence of executive management in 
the board selection process.60 Supporters of separate CEO and 
Chair roles also regard duality as the cause of corporate boards’ 
failure to exercise their management and monitoring 
responsibilities to protect shareholder interests.61 
III.  THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS ABOUT DUALITY 
Some commentators have suggested that the prevalence 
of duality implies that a combined CEO and Chair position is 
the optimal leadership structure for large public companies.62 
Supporters of duality maintain that if duality were not an 
effective and efficient governance structure, most public 
companies could not maintain duality and still survive in the 
competitive marketplace.63 Despite the prevalence of duality in 
corporate governance, however, not all of corporate America 
believes that duality is the optimal leadership structure. There 
  
 58 See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 200 (suggesting that duality not be 
denounced without “a cogent explanation for how such an important corporate control 
practice can be wealth-decreasing and still survive in the competitive marketplace for 
so long across so many companies”). 
 59 Steven A. Ramirez, The Special Interest Race to CEO Primacy and the End 
of Corporate Governance Law, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 345, 345 (2007). 
 60 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41, 43. See Sydney Finkelstein & Richard A. 
D’Aveni, CEO Duality as a Double-Edged Sword: How Boards of Directors Balance 
Entrenchment Avoidance and Unity of Command, 37 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1079, 1102 (1994) 
(pointing out that the business press often expresses the view that “CEO duality 
formally institutionalizes the dominance of CEOs over boards”); Mark J. Roe, Chaos 
and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641, 641 (1996) (“Although 
institutions that have survived cannot be too inefficient, evolution-toward-efficiency 
constrains but does not fully determine the institutions we observe.”). 
 61 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41, 43; MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 13. 
 62 See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 199-200 (suggesting that the dominance 
of duality implies that having an independent chairperson is not likely to be the optimal 
leadership structure for most public companies); Lex Donaldson & James H. Davis, 
Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO Governance and Shareholder Returns, 16 
AUSTL. J. MGMT. 49, 61 (1991) (explaining that based on the stewardship theory of 
corporate governance, a majority of large U.S. companies have already adopted the 
optimal corporate governance structure where the CEO also serves as the board Chair).  
 63 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 199-200; see also Donaldson & Davis, 
supra note 62, at 61 (“[S]hould corporations bow to pressures to appoint independent 
board chairs[,] the performance of the corporations and the returns to their 
shareholders would suffer.”). 
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is a view among many shareholders, business leaders, industry 
groups, corporate governance advisers, and regulators that 
corporate governance is more effective and efficient when the 
CEO and Chair positions are separated than when they are 
combined.64 
Various theories have been advanced for and against 
duality. The following analysis focuses on the advantages of the 
CEO-Chair and nonexecutive Chair models. In most cases, the 
arguments in favor of one leadership structure are essentially 
arguments against the other leadership structure.  
A. Arguments Supporting Combined Positions 
A unifying theme of the various arguments in support of 
duality is that combining the CEO and Chair positions 
enhances the board’s management performance. The board’s 
management responsibilities require that it make key decisions 
affecting the company.65 Proponents of duality contend that 
combining the CEO and Chair positions enhances the board’s 
management role. A combined CEO-Chair, they argue, 
provides the board with more complete and timely information 
about the company, provides the company with a unified 
command structure and a consistent leadership direction, and 
creates a collaborative and collegial environment for board 
decision making.66 
Taking these arguments separately, the first posits that 
the board of directors will benefit from having a Chair who has 
deep, first-hand knowledge of the company.67 Proponents 
contend that a board Chair who also serves as the CEO is 
likely to spend more time at the company, to have more 
detailed information about the strengths and weaknesses of the 
company, and to have a deeper understanding of the 
operational and financial health of the company.68 Presumably, 
the CEO would use the knowledge and experience that she 
gains from serving as the company’s top executive to contribute 
  
 64 See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 189-91 (giving examples of business 
leaders, shareholders, regulators, and researchers who oppose duality).  
 65 See supra Part I.A. 
 66 See infra Part III.A. 
 67 See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 194 (“Presumably, CEOs have 
unparalleled specialized knowledge regarding the strategic challenges and 
opportunities facing the firm.”); Boyd, supra note 31, at 301 (stating that “the CEO-
Chair would be expected to have a greater knowledge of the firm and its industry”). 
 68 Clark, supra note 5, at 300; cf. Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 194.  
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to her role as Chair of the board, leading and guiding the board 
to understand, deliberate, and make fundamental business 
decisions for the company.69 In that sense, the CEO-Chair’s 
“specific knowledge may trump [the] general wisdom and 
outside perspective” of a non-CEO Chair in the decision-
making process.70 
A related theory is that combining the CEO and Chair 
positions reduces the cost of information transfer between 
company leaders.71 A combined CEO-Chair position avoids the 
need for the transfer of information that must take place if 
different individuals hold the CEO and Chair positions.72 
Because information transfer may be costly, untimely, or 
incomplete, having critical information reside in one combined 
CEO-Chair may improve the ability of that individual to 
perform management responsibilities.73 
There is some evidence, however, that questions the 
degree of information costs that arise from separating the CEO 
and Chair positions.74 For one thing, researchers have observed 
that a company can mitigate the information costs of 
separating top leadership positions by appointing nonexecutive 
Chairs with significant experience and in-depth knowledge 
based on their long-time membership on the company’s board.75 
Moreover, combining the CEO and Chair positions may create 
information costs, in that many CEOs impose an unwritten 
policy that all communication of information from inside the 
company to the board must first be approved by the CEO.76 A 
board with a dual CEO-Chair may lack the healthy skepticism 
necessary to examine information that has been screened and 
filtered by the CEO prior to being provided to the board.77 
  
 69 See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 7 (“CEOs have specialized 
knowledge regarding the strategic challenges and opportunities facing the firm that is 
valuable to the chairman’s job.”). 
 70 Clark, supra note 5, at 300. 
 71 Dawn Harris & Constance E. Helfat, CEO Duality, Succession, Capabilities 
and Agency Theory: Commentary and Research Agenda, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 901, 
903 (1998). See generally Brickley et al., supra note 25. 
 72 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 194-95. 
 73 Harris & Helfat, supra note 71, at 903. 
 74 See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 199-200 (reporting the average tenure 
of independent board chairs in a representative sample). 
 75 See id.  
 76 See Ide, supra note 5, at 838-39 (criticizing the practice of the CEO in 
screening information to the board and suggesting that others in senior management 
provide information directly to the board). 
 77 See Vo, supra note 24, at 25 (suggesting that directors maintain a healthy 
skepticism for information that management provides to the board). 
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The second broad argument supporting duality is that a 
combined position provides a unified command structure and 
reduces the company’s cost of decision making.78 A CEO-Chair 
can exert greater authority and speed in making and 
implementing strategic decisions for the company.79 Thus, 
decisions made by a CEO-Chair may be clearer, timelier, and 
more consistent than decisions made by a CEO who has to 
negotiate and consult with a board that is led by a separate 
Chair.80 In addition, having one individual occupy both the CEO 
and Chair positions reduces public confusion about who is in 
charge of the company, and clarifies who is responsible for the 
company’s performance.81 
There are countervailing considerations to the 
advantages of duality’s unified command structure. The 
concentration of corporate leadership authority in one person, 
the CEO-Chair, may constrain board oversight and restrict 
board adoption of appropriate strategies that adapt to changing 
business environments.82 What appear to be clear and 
consistent decisions on the part of the CEO-Chair may turn out 
to be manifestations of the executive’s fixation on a set course 
of action or unwillingness to adopt new business strategies to 
meet pressing competitive conditions.83 
The third line of argument in favor of duality is that a 
combined CEO-Chair may enhance the board’s performance of 
  
 78 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Martijn Cremers & 
Urs Peyer, CEO Centrality 10 n.9 (Harvard L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & 
Bus., Discussion Paper No. 601, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1030107; 
Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1083; Roberta S. Karmel, Splitting the CEO 
and Chairman, 231 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3 (2004). 
 79 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 7; 
Boyd, supra note 31, at 301; Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 195; Harris & Helfat, 
supra note 71, at 902; cf. Karmel, supra note 78, at 3. 
 80 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Boyd, supra note 31, at 301, 304; Brickley 
et al., supra note 25, at 195; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1080, 1083; 
Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164. 
 81 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Boyd, supra note 31, at 301, 304; Brickley 
et al., supra note 25, at 195; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079-80, 1083-84; 
Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164; Makoto Toda & William McCarty, 
Corporate Governance Changes in the Two Largest Economies: What’s Happening in the 
U.S. and Japan?, 32 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 189, 213 (2005). 
 82 See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42-43 (comparing IBM’s failure to adopt 
strategies to prevent loss of market share with Compaq Computer’s successful adoption 
of a lower-priced product model); Ramirez, supra note 59, at 370 (“Corporate 
governance should operate to limit CEO autonomy and to protect investors; this will 
lead to superior outcomes.”).  
 83 See Boyd, supra note 31, at 301 (explaining that “duality has been blamed 
for poor performance and slow response to change in firms such as General Motors, 
Digital Equipment Corporation, and Goodyear Tire and Rubber”). 
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its management responsibilities by facilitating cooperation 
between board directors and company executives.84 Some 
scholars have suggested that a board may perform its 
managerial role better when there is a collegial and supportive 
relationship among directors and officers.85 The CEO is the 
leader of the company’s executive group, and several members 
of that executive group are also likely to serve as directors on 
the board.86 Where the CEO is also the leader of the board of 
directors, the joint leadership may prompt more cooperation 
between the two groups.87 By enhancing collegiality and 
collaboration between board directors and company executives, 
a CEO-Chair may thus facilitate consensus that leads to 
smooth and efficient decision making.88 
Observers of boardroom dynamics indicate that many 
corporate boards indeed develop a close-knit culture that 
values internal harmony over vigorous debate and dissension.89 
However, it is not entirely clear whether and to what extent 
the board’s managerial function depends on a collegial 
relationship among directors and managers.90 Taking a neutral 
  
 84 See Clark, supra note 5, at 278 (asserting that “boards of directors perform 
the managerial role better when there is a ‘collegial and collaborative’ mode of 
interaction among directors and officers”). 
 85 See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to 
Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 35-45 
(2002) (arguing that an increased emphasis on the board’s monitoring role may 
exacerbate tension and distrust between the outside directors and management, which 
may adversely affect the board’s performance of its management role). 
 86 CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 400; see also Gordon, supra note 6, at 1472-
76 (describing a shift in board composition away from a majority of inside directors 
toward a majority of independent directors during the period from 1950 to 2005, but 
noting that most corporations maintain one or two inside directors on their boards). 
 87 Cf. Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42 (explaining that proponents of duality 
contend that separating the top leadership positions may create rivalry between the 
CEO and the Chair). 
 88 See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 7 (“Having one leader can also 
minimize the potential for rivalry.”); Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1284 
(“Board service was largely viewed as honorific and responsive to management 
concerns; the arm’s-length relationship implied in the board’s monitoring role over 
management was replaced by a collegial relationship between the two . . . .”). 
 89 Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431; see also Brudney, supra note 18, at 
610-17 (explaining that the obstacles to directors’ taking an arm’s-length stance toward 
management include unclear legal standards and weak sanctions, limited monetary 
incentives, psychological effects of small group dynamics, and social relationships with 
management).  
 90 See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 3.02 cmt. d (“The board’s obligation to 
oversee the performance of the principal senior executives does not imply an 
antagonistic relationship between the board and the executives. Rather, it 
contemplates a collegial relationship that is supportive as well as watchful[,] . . . 
challenging yet positive, arm’s length but not adversary.”); Brown, supra note 30, at 
1107-08 (explaining that board failure often results from a lack of constructive criticism 
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or critical position toward certain information provided and 
actions taken by senior management does not necessarily 
impede a board’s deliberative and decision-making processes.91 
Rather, directors who take an objective and probing stance 
toward senior executives while deliberating and making 
decisions for the company may be more likely to fulfill the 
directors’ managerial responsibilities.92 Conversely, interaction 
between board directors and corporate executives that is 
markedly supportive and accommodating may signal the 
board’s improper deference to, and mere rubber-stamping of, 
executive decisions and conduct.93 
Arguments in support of duality focus primarily on the 
potential improvement in the board’s management role, 
without much consideration of the board’s other major role—
namely, monitoring executive behavior. While some 
commentators suggest that the CEO-Chair has the in-depth 
knowledge about the company necessary to effectively monitor 
management misconduct,94 the CEO-Chair with a keen 
understanding of the company’s strengths and weaknesses may 
be the very executive who is engaging in managerial 
misconduct.95 Notwithstanding the knowledge and 
understanding of the CEO-Chair, the effectiveness of the board 
Chair’s monitoring role is obviated when the board Chair 
position is occupied by the very same misbehaving CEO. 
  
from the board to management and from information asymmetries between the board 
and management). 
 91 See BUS. ROUNDTABLE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7 (2005), 
available at http://www.businessroundtable.org/sites/default/files/CorporateGovPrinciples.pdf 
(“Effective directors maintain an attitude of constructive skepticism; they ask incisive, probing 
questions and require accurate, honest answers . . . .”); Developments, supra note 16, at 2200 
(explaining that “increased independence and activism need not result in a crippled board”). 
 92 See Jeffrey A. Sonnenfeld, What Makes Great Boards Great, HARV. BUS. 
REV., Sept. 2002, at 106, 111 (“Perhaps the most important link in the virtuous cycle is 
the capacity to challenge one another’s assumptions and beliefs. Respect and trust do 
not imply endless affability or absence of disagreement.”). 
 93 Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431 (explaining that corporate boards 
that prize collegiality over objectivity may fail to scrutinize and discipline executives). 
 94 Cf. Clark, supra note 5, at 300 (discussing the board’s monitoring role).  
 95 See id. (“One could even argue that independent directors will not know 
enough about the company to act as good monitors of potential misconduct and self-
dealing, even though it’s hard to then argue that inside directors, with their conflicted 
interests, would do better in this role.”); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 424 
(affirming that directors in public companies have the ultimate responsibility to 
scrutinize the conduct of their company’s top executives).  
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B. Arguments Supporting Separate Positions 
Supporters of splitting the CEO and Chair positions 
argue that separation enhances the board’s performance of its 
management responsibilities by improving both the quality and 
the timeliness of board decision making.96 Having a board Chair 
who is not an executive of the company may bring fresh 
knowledge and insight to the board’s decision-making process.97 
With learning and experiences outside of the company whose 
board she leads, a nonexecutive Chair may provide unique 
perspectives that enhance the board’s performance of its 
management duties to deliberate and make strategic and 
fundamental business decisions.98 
A nonexecutive Chair may also facilitate the board’s 
management function by enabling the board to quickly make 
decisions and adopt new strategies to meet changing business 
environments.99 Supporters of separating the top leadership 
positions often point to Compaq Computer as an example of a 
company where having a separate Chair enabled the 
business—over the strong objection of the company’s CEO—to 
adopt a lower-priced product line to remain competitive in the 
industry.100 Compaq’s nonexecutive Chair confirmed that 
“Compaq’s board was able to act quickly because of the 
corporate governance structure in place at Compaq where the 
CEO and Chairman roles are distinct.”101 Similarly, the 
separation of the CEO and Chair roles at Cypress 
Semiconductor Corporation has been regarded as the reason 
that the board was able to make a strategic financial decision 
to stop the CEO from investing the company’s cash account in 
the stock market shortly before the dot-com crash.102 Although 
T.J. Rodgers, then-CEO of Cypress Semiconductor, was not 
pleased with the board’s decision at the time, he later 
acknowledged that he was glad the board stopped him because 
  
 96 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42. 
 97 Clark, supra note 5, at 300.  
 98 Id.; Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164.  
 99 See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42 (referring to the contention that 
“Roger Smith, in his dual capacities of Chairman and CEO [of General Motors], 
restricted board oversight and the adoption of strategies appropriate to the changing 
environment”). 
 100 See, e.g., id. at 43. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Caggiano, supra note 51, at 5. 
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the board’s decision “ended up saving [the company] a lot of 
money.”103 
Supporters of separating the CEO and Chair positions 
contend that the board also performs its monitoring role better 
when there is a nonexecutive Chair.104 The monitoring role 
requires directors to exert oversight over corporate managers 
in order to detect and discipline managerial inefficiencies and 
misconduct.105 Thus, duality may cause failure by the board to 
effectively monitor and control executive management.106 
In public companies, boards of directors delegate day-to-
day management responsibilities instead of personally 
performing these tasks themselves.107 With management tasks 
delegated, it is crucial that corporate boards effectively monitor 
executive managers’ performance.108 The board’s ability to 
monitor the CEO and other executives, in turn, depends on the 
board’s power to exert control over the CEO and other 
executives.109 However, a CEO who also serves as board Chair 
has de facto authority over the board, notwithstanding the 
board’s legal authority and responsibility to monitor and 
control the CEO.110 Where the CEO, by serving simultaneously 
as board Chair, has practical authority and influence over 
other board members, the board’s power to control the CEO 
and other executives is curtailed or ineffective.111 Consequently, 
  
 103 Id. 
 104 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Brown, supra note 30, at 1113; Finkelstein 
& D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079, 1082; Harris & Helfat, supra note 71, at 902. 
 105 Gordon, supra note 6, at 1468; Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 790; Millstein 
& MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1293. 
 106 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 189-90; 
Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 790; see also Brown, supra note 30, at 1113 (“[T]he board 
relationship has shifted from one of ‘CEO domination’ to one of ‘CEO accountability,’ as 
companies move to separate CEO and board chairperson positions.”); Ramirez, supra 
note 59, at 392 (“[P]ermitting unbridled CEO power to reign in corporate America, as it 
does today, is inconsistent with any principled economic view of how corporate 
governance should function.”). 
 107 Brown, supra note 30, at 1107; Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 
1283-84; Mark S. Mizruchi, Who Controls Whom? An Examination of the Relation 
Between Management and Boards of Directors in Large American Corporations, 8 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 426, 430 (1983); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 424. 
 108 Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1292; Sundaramurthy et al., supra 
note 20, at 232.  
 109 Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1292; Sanders & Carpenter, supra 
note 31, at 164. 
 110 Boyd, supra note 31, at 303; Brown, supra note 30, at 1113; Del Jones & James 
Kim, Stockholders Want Boards of Independents, USA TODAY, May 14, 1993, at 1B. 
 111 Boyd, supra note 31, at 303; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079, 
1082; Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 233; see also Millstein & MacAvoy, supra 
note 30, at 1292 (“Directors who are members of management or are otherwise closely 
 
2010] TO BE OR NOT TO BE BOTH CEO AND BOARD CHAIR 85 
the board is likely to perform its monitoring function more 
effectively when the board Chair does not also serve as the 
leader of the executive group that is the very focus of the 
board’s monitoring.112 
Proponents of duality challenge the theory that a CEO-
Chair effectively controls the modern corporate board. They 
contend that board functions are not concentrated in the hands 
of the Chair, but are delegated and dispersed to board 
committees, such as the compensation and auditing 
committees.113 This contention has merit, in that the CEO-Chair 
has total and absolute control of the board only when it is a 
single-member board.114 However, the modern corporation has a 
multi-member board that often contains a number of inside 
directors,115 a fact that precipitated the director and board 
independence requirements discussed in Part I.B. The CEO-
Chair, as the top-ranking executive, exerts influence and 
control over the inside directors who are lower-ranking 
executives of the company.116 Outside directors may also feel a 
sense of loyalty and gratitude to the CEO because the CEO 
often plays an influential, if not decisive, role over the election 
of the outside directors.117 In addition, the CEO has immense 
power and control over the entire board when that CEO has 
  
linked to management have the same conflict as management in evaluating corporate 
performance.”). 
 112 Boyd, supra note 31, at 303; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079, 
1082; Millstein & MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1292-93; Sundaramurthy et al., supra 
note 20, at 233. 
 113 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196; see also Boyd, supra note 31, at 301 
(explaining the view that the board Chair position is largely ceremonial and symbolic). 
 114 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196. 
 115 CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 400; see also Dalton & Kesner, supra note 
32, at 35, 39 (finding that more than 30% of board members in a sample of 50 large 
companies in the United States are “insiders,” defined as directors who are also full-
time officers of the company); Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 793-94 (citing various 
studies’ findings that the proportion of outside directors ranges from 12% to 100%, with 
a mean of 70%, for a sample of 384 of the Fortune 500 companies). 
 116 See Dalton & Kesner, supra note 32, at 35 (expressing doubt that an inside 
director can objectively evaluate the CEO); Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 
1082 n.4 (stating that inside directors are likely to have more information about the 
company’s operations, but the inside directors’ monitoring ability is likely curtailed 
because they are unlikely to contradict the CEO who is their work boss); Kesner et al., 
supra note 6, at 790 (noting the inside directors’ awkward task of evaluating the CEO 
who is their day-to-day boss); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 425 (recognizing the 
difficulties with getting an unbiased inside director’s assessment of the CEO’s 
performance). 
 117 Brown, supra note 30, at 1113; Gordon, supra note 6, at 1496; Millstein & 
MacAvoy, supra note 30, at 1284; Mizruchi, supra note 107, at 431; Ramirez, supra 
note 59, at 363. 
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the ability, as board Chair, to make committee assignments 
and, consequently, to hand-pick the directors to assign to 
functionally important committees, such as the compensation, 
nomination, and audit committees.118 
Underlying the theory that a nonexecutive Chair 
facilitates both the board’s management and monitoring roles 
is the concept of agency costs.119 Those who prefer to see two 
separate individuals serve in the CEO and Chair positions 
contend that having a separate Chair reduces the agency costs 
inherent in the corporate structure that separates control and 
ownership.120 As one scholar explains, agency costs arise 
because corporate decisions are made by “agents whose 
decisions are influenced by private interests”; thus, their 
choices might not be made in an optimal fashion to further 
shareholder interests.121 When company management acts more 
for personal interests than for general shareholder interests, 
the board of directors has failed in its duty to monitor and 
discipline management.122 Not surprisingly, supporters of duality 
argue that having a separate Chair simply shifts the agency costs 
  
 118 See Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079, 1082 (commenting that 
the chairperson of the board often controls the director nominating process, which gives 
the chairperson the power to favor directors who are loyal to the chairperson); 
Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 233 (concluding that a CEO who also occupies 
the position of board chair compromises the board functions of setting agenda, 
governing, and monitoring board committees and management executives). 
 119 See Donaldson & Davis, supra note 62, at 51 (“Agency and organisational 
economics theories predict that when the CEO also holds the dual rôle [sic] of chair, 
then the interests of the owners will be sacrificed to a degree in favour of management, 
that is, there will be managerial opportunism and agency loss.”); Ramirez, supra note 
59, at 377 (“[T]here is powerful evidence that the separation of CEO and chairman of 
the board into two positions reduces agency costs and enhances firm value.”). 
 120 See Boyd, supra note 31, at 304 (citing Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen’s 
observation that duality signals that the corporation does not separate its decision 
management from its decision control, and that the corporation will suffer in the 
competition for survival as a result of such lack of separation); Brickley et al., supra 
note 25, at 192-93 (citing Michael Jensen and William Meckling’s definition of agency 
costs as the sum of the costs to establish incentive and control mechanisms for 
directors and officers and the costs resulting from not providing appropriate or 
complete incentives and controls over directors and officers). 
 121 Bebchuk et al., supra note 78, at 11; see also Walsh & Seward, supra note 
21, at 421-22 (citing Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’s observation that managers may 
be tempted to pursue prestige, power, and other personal interests instead of 
shareholder interests).  
 122 Dalton & Kesner, supra note 32, at 34; see also CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 
500 (citing In re Enron Corp. Final Report of Neal Batson, court-appointed examiner for 
Enron, as stating that the Enron board could have prevented or minimized the Enron 
officers’ misconduct by terminating the officers’ employment, refusing to approve the 
company’s financial statements, and notifying the SEC of the officers’ wrongdoing); Gordon, 
supra note 6, at 1469 (“Independent directors . . . enhance the fidelity of managers to 
shareholder objectives, as opposed to managerial interests or stakeholder interests.”). 
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from controlling the combined CEO-Chair’s behavior to 
controlling the separate Chair’s behavior.123 However, for the 
reasons discussed below, the agency costs of controlling the 
nonexecutive Chair’s behavior are likely to be lower than the 
agency costs of controlling a board Chair who also serves as CEO. 
A nonexecutive Chair may reduce agency costs through 
her control of information flow to the board and control over 
the board agenda.124 Having a separate Chair provides the 
board with an additional source of information besides the 
CEO.125 This independent source of information is vital to both 
the board’s decision-making and oversight functions, because 
empirical studies126 and anecdotal evidence127 suggest that 
company executives attempt to circumvent the corporate 
system of checks and balances by controlling the flow of 
information to the board. In addition, the board Chair has the 
power to set the agenda for board meetings.128 A board Chair 
  
 123 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 193-94. 
 124 Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082; see also Baliga et al., supra 
note 2, at 41-42 (citing research on management’s domination of the board through 
managerial control of information flow); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431 
(explaining that executives may attempt to cover up their negative qualities or low 
performance by controlling the board’s meeting agenda and withholding relevant 
information from the board). 
 125 Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164; see also CHIAPPINELLI, supra 
note 3, at 501-03 (citing In re Enron Corp. Final Report of Neal Batson, that the 
company’s management “failed to present clearly Enron’s SPE transactions and the 
total amount and maturities of its off-balance sheet debt to the Finance Committee, . . . 
used misleading terms and confusing jargon, and . . . presented information to the 
Enron Board and its committees in a manner that obfuscated the substance of the SPE 
transactions”); Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The Prime Directive, 75 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 921, 935 (2007) (noting that CEOs tend to provide the board with ample 
information relating to successful or promising projects while giving scant information 
about projects that go awry). 
 126 See, e.g., Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41-42 (listing empirical studies 
conducted throughout the 1970s and 1980s); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431 
(listing empirical studies). 
 127 See CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 504 (citing In re Enron Corp. Final 
Report of Neal Batson, that “the Enron board did not function as an effective check and 
balance. This failure may have resulted from . . . a carefully orchestrated strategy of 
Enron’s senior officers . . . .”); Judith H. Dobrzynski, Chairman and CEO: One Hat Too 
Many, BUS. WK., Nov. 18, 1991, at 124 (reporting that at Salomon Inc., “the board was 
kept in the dark long after [then] Chairman and CEO John H. Gutfreund learned of 
Salomon’s transgressions” of illegal bidding in Treasury security auctions); Stevenson, 
supra note 32 (explaining that Fisons P.L.C.’s decision to split its CEO and Chair 
positions was implemented “primarily to assuage the concerns of shareholders about 
too much power resting with a single executive who did not seem inclined to keep 
shareholders fully briefed on the company’s difficulties”). 
 128 Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082; Sundaramurthy et al., 
supra note 20, at 233; see also CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 498-99 (stating that Ken 
Lay was the Chairman and CEO of Enron and that Enron management provided board 
members with agendas for board meetings (citation omitted)). 
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who does not also serve as the company’s CEO may be more 
likely to focus the board agenda on, and provide board 
members with information about, issues that question 
management judgment or challenge management decisions.129 
Having separate individuals serve in the CEO and 
Chair positions may also reduce agency costs because a board 
that is led by a nonexecutive Chair is more likely to evaluate 
objectively whether management’s performance, including that 
of the CEO, enhances shareholder interests.130 When the roles of 
CEO and board Chair are combined in the same person, 
directors are put in the awkward position of evaluating a CEO 
who is, at the same time, their leader on the board and the 
person on whom they depend for board nominations and 
committee assignments.131 The situation is even worse for 
directors who are also executives of the company; for these 
inside directors, there is the added tension of evaluating the 
individual who is their top executive boss and who plays a 
large role in their position advancement, compensation, and job 
security.132 Thus, although the board is often regarded as the 
  
 129 See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41-42 (referring to research that shows 
company executives circumvent the corporate system of checks and balances by 
controlling board agendas); Sanford V. Berg & Stanley K. Smith, CEO and Board 
Chairman: A Quantitative Study of Dual vs. Unitary Board Leadership, 3 DIRECTORS & 
BOARDS 34, 34-35 (1978) (“[S]elective presentation of information to the Board of 
Directors can permit the CEO to continue in unprofitable activity—in the hopes that 
some unforeseen event will reverse the downward trend.”); Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 
supra note 60, at 1082 (commenting that the chairperson of the board can “dominate 
both the agenda and content of board meetings”). 
 130 Boyd, supra note 31, at 302; Wallace N. Davidson III, Carol Nemec & Dan 
L. Worrell, Succession Planning vs. Agency Theory: A Test of Harris and Helfat’s 
Interpretation of Plurality Announcement Market Returns, 22 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 179, 
179 (2001); Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 232. See Baliga et al., supra note 2, 
at 42-43 (explaining the contention that IBM’s duality governance structure is to blame 
for “the board’s difficulty in critically evaluating management performance and 
exercising independent judgment”). 
 131 See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42 (explaining that combining the CEO 
and Chair roles may make it difficult for directors to be candid when evaluating 
company performance); Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079, 1082 
(commenting that the chairperson of the board often controls the director nominating 
process, which gives the chairperson the power to favor directors who are loyal to the 
chairperson); Mizruchi, supra note 107, at 431 (stating the widely held view that 
“board members are handpicked by management”); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 
431 (citing a study’s finding that directors who “challenge[d] the president’s powers of 
control were advised . . . that such conduct was inappropriate or were asked to resign”). 
 132 See Dalton & Kesner, supra note 32, at 35 (expressing doubt that an inside 
director can objectively evaluate the CEO); Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 
1082 n.4 (stating that inside directors are likely to have more information about the 
company’s operations, but the inside directors’ monitoring ability is likely curtailed 
because they are unlikely to contradict the CEO who is their work boss); Kesner et al., 
supra note 6, at 790 (noting the inside directors’ awkward task of evaluating the CEO 
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shareholders’ “first line of defense” against mismanagement,133 
a board that is led by a person holding both the Chair and CEO 
positions is not likely to intervene when management’s 
behavior is inconsistent with shareholder interests.134 
Furthermore, the CEO-Chair, in the role of board Chair, 
would essentially be evaluating his own performance as CEO.135 
It seems unlikely that the CEO-Chair—a successful business 
executive who has been elevated to serve concurrently in the 
top two leadership positions of a company—would rate his own 
performance as lackluster.136 Supporters of a separate Chair 
thus believe that the CEO whose performance is being 
evaluated should not be put in charge of the team conducting 
the evaluation.137 As one governance expert observed, “One of 
the major functions of the board is to supervise management. If 
the chairman of the board is also in management, then he is in 
effect marking his own exam papers.”138 
Another argument in support of separating the top 
leadership positions is that it minimizes the risk of 
entrenchment.139 A board operating under the leadership of a 
  
who is their day-to-day boss); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 425 (recognizing the 
difficulties with getting an unbiased assessment from an inside director’s assessment 
of the CEO’s performance). 
 133 Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1081. 
 134 Dalton & Kesner, supra note 32, at 35. 
 135 Davidson et al., supra note 130, at 180; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 
60, at 1082. 
 136 See Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 125, at 935 (“The CEO, like most of us, 
wants to appear in a good light. She has the incentive to put the best spin on her 
accomplishments.”); Albert A. Cannella, Jr. & Michael Lubatkin, Succession as a 
Sociopolitical Process: Internal Impediments to Outsider Selection, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
763, 765 (1993) (citing evidence that “powerful CEOs, when confronted with poor 
performance, may try to deflect the blame onto weaker subordinates, who are then 
dismissed while the CEO remains”); Dobrzynski, supra note 127, at 124 (“You can 
hardly blame a CEO for refusing to recognize the need for new talent at the top.”); 
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431 (suggesting that executives value their job 
security and “strive to make sure that the board sees them as high-effort/high-ability 
people”). 
 137 See Dalton & Kesner, supra note 32, at 35 (asking whether it is 
“appropriate that the very person to be evaluated is the head of the evaluation team”); 
Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 790 (explaining that “chairmen/CEOs cannot represent 
the shareholders in the first role and at the same time impartially sit in judgment on 
their own performance in the second role”). 
 138 Stevenson, supra note 32 (quoting Blenyth Jenkins, the director of 
corporate affairs for the Institute of Directors, a London trade group). 
 139 See Cannella & Lubatkin, supra note 136, at 770 (suggesting that 
incumbent CEOs who also hold the board Chair title have more institutional power 
than those who do not also serve as board Chair and, therefore, “may be able to 
forestall their own removal”); Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 216 (commenting that a 
person holding both the CEO and Chair positions is “more powerful and less easily 
dislodged”); Ramirez, supra note 59, at 385 (“[T]he powerful will seek to entrench their 
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CEO-Chair lacks the motivation and incentive to objectively 
evaluate and discipline the dual executive,140 which increases 
the risk of entrenching the CEO-Chair in both positions.141 
CEO-Chair entrenchment, in turn, increases the potential for 
this powerful executive to use the corporation to further his 
own personal interests instead of furthering general 
shareholder welfare.142 Supporters of separating the positions 
buttress their position by pointing to well-recognized strategies 
of managerial entrenchment in a duality system, including the 
wrangling of a generous base salary for the executive and the 
engineering of a bonus compensation system that is not tied to 
company performance in the stock market.143 
In addition, an executive who can secure the role as the 
integrating mechanism between the management group and 
the board of directors—namely, the role of a combined CEO 
and Chair—may have succeeded in raising his value in the 
managerial labor market and enhancing his image as 
irreplaceable in the eyes of shareholders and directors.144 Famed 
governance scholars Eugene Fama and Michael Jensen warn 
that allowing the CEO to also occupy the role of board Chair 
signals that the corporation has failed to separate its decision 
management from its decision control, which increases the 
likelihood that the CEO-Chair will take inefficient and 
opportunistic actions that deviate from shareholder interests 
and reduce shareholder wealth.145 
Supporters of duality respond to the entrenchment 
argument by pointing out that even where one individual 
occupies both the CEO and Chair positions, the board as a 
  
control and position, rather than expose themselves to a truly competitive 
environment . . . . There are few incumbents more powerful than the incumbent CEOs 
of public corporations.”). 
 140 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41, 43.  
 141 Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1079, 1082, 1102; see also Walsh 
& Seward, supra note 21, at 432 (explaining that a key “entrenchment strategy is to 
neutralize the control mechanisms themselves”). 
 142 Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082; see also Mallette & Fowler, 
supra note 3, at 1028 (commenting that the “power and influence of a CEO-chairperson 
provide an opportunity to increase job security and personal well-being at the expense 
of shareholders”); Ramirez, supra note 59, at 348 (asserting that the United States 
corporate governance system is “devolving towards CEO primacy and the end of 
shareholder primacy”). 
 143 Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 432; see also Ramirez, supra note 59, at 
376 (explaining that study results show that enhanced CEO power is correlated to 
higher CEO compensation but not to CEO performance).  
 144 See Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 432 (describing various managerial 
entrenchment practices). 
 145 Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082. 
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whole retains the power to hire and fire senior management, 
including the CEO.146 While they concede that it may be easier 
for a board to remove a CEO who is not also the Chair than to 
remove a CEO-Chair, proponents of duality assert that the 
board can and does exert its removal power.147 Examples 
include the board’s removal of CEO-Chair Kay Whitmore from 
Eastman Kodak, CEO-Chair Robert Stempel from General 
Motors, CEO-Chair John Akers from IBM, CEO-Chair James 
Robinson from American Express, and CEO-Chair Paul Lego 
from Westinghouse.148 Proponents of separating the top 
leadership positions, however, contend that these removals 
would have occurred earlier if the ousted CEOs were not also 
board Chairs.149 
Another agency argument favoring the separation of the 
CEO and Chair positions is that nonexecutive Chairs have 
more incentives than CEO-Chairs to carry out their 
management and monitoring functions in ways that further 
shareholder interests.150 This is because a nonexecutive Chair 
does not receive a salary from the corporation, and the fees for 
serving on the board are often modest compared to the Chair’s 
other sources of income.151 Furthermore, intangible incentives, 
such as avoiding social criticism and protecting reputation, 
  
 146 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196; see also Mizruchi, supra note 107, at 
433 (explaining that the board has the ultimate control in the corporation because of its 
power to hire and fire the CEO). 
 147 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id.; see also Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 41-42 (referring to research that 
shows company executives circumventing the corporate system of checks and balances 
by resisting management changes despite evidence of poor performance); Finkelstein & 
D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1081 (stating that independent directors are more likely 
than insider directors to remove a CEO who has performed poorly).  
 150 See Clark, supra note 5, at 300 (explaining that independent directors have 
less incentives to act contrary to shareholder interests); Gordon, supra note 6, at 1471 
(noting that independent directors are “less dependent on the CEO and more sensitive 
to external assessments of their performance as directors”); Roberta Romano, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 
1521, 1529-30 (2005) (commenting that outside directors may be more effective than 
inside directors in monitoring management conduct because their financial dependence 
on the corporation, in most cases, is limited to a fixed director fee instead of a variable 
management compensation package, which is subject to fluctuation depending on the 
financial performance of the corporation); see also infra note 191 and accompanying 
text for the counterargument that independent directors are not truly independent 
because they are selected by management and lack personal incentives to act 
independently of management. 
 151 Brown, supra note 30, at 1114-15; Clark, supra note 5, at 300; see also 
Romano, supra note 150, at 1529-30 (noting that independent directors have no 
incentive to contribute to audit failures by misstating earnings “because their financial 
dependence on the corporation is limited to directors’ fees”). 
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may encourage a nonexecutive Chair to act in the interests of 
shareholders instead of merely following management’s 
dictates.152 Thus, a board led by an independent Chair may be 
more open to considering and accepting a takeover bid,153 an 
action that has been demonstrated to result in an increase in 
shareholder value.154 On the other hand, a board led by a CEO-
Chair is more likely to adopt poison pills and to resist takeover 
bids,155 defensive actions that generally result in a decrease in 
shareholder value.156 
A response to the argument that a nonexecutive Chair 
has more incentive to protect shareholder interests is that any 
danger to shareholder interests from combining the CEO and 
Chair positions may be mitigated by external monitoring and 
by internal alignment of CEO interests with shareholder 
interests through compensating the CEO with large amounts of 
company stock and stock options.157 This response is weakened, 
however, by the apparent failure of external monitors, such as 
  
 152 Brown, supra note 30, at 1116; Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 
1081-82; see also Bainbridge, supra note 5, at 391 (explaining that “if the company fails 
on their watch . . . the independent directors’ reputation . . . is likely to suffer”).  
 153 See Clark, supra note 5, at 300 (stating that independent directors are 
more accepting of, and less resistant to, takeover bids). 
 154 Empirical studies show that shareholders of the acquired company 
experience large stock gains following announcement of a takeover bid, while 
shareholders of the acquiring company do not suffer an offsetting loss of stock value. 
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 435. Results from such studies suggest that 
takeovers result in no net shareholder loss; thus, takeover activities, overall, are 
beneficial to the economy. Id. 
 155 See Boyd, supra note 31, at 302 (noting that signs of CEO-Chairs’ 
ineffective governance include resistance to hostile takeovers and adoption of poison 
pills); Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082 (citing study results that show a 
positive correlation between duality and adoption of poison pills).  
 156 See Ramirez, supra note 59, at 375-76 (finding that anti-takeover 
mechanisms generally correlate with higher executive compensation, lower 
productivity, and lower profitability). Empirical studies show that a company’s stock 
price drops significantly “upon the announcement of a poison pill adoption, while share 
prices increased significantly if the firms abandoned plans to adopt a poison pill.” 
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 439; see also Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen 
Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate Governance? 2-4 (Harvard L. Sch., John M. Olin 
Ctr. for L., Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=593423 (arguing that golden parachutes and poison pills correlate to a 
reduction in shareholder value). See generally John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation 
in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001) (describing 
takeover defenses and the types of companies that adopt them); Marcel Kahan & 
Edward B. Rock, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive 
Responses to Takeover Law, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 871 (2002) (describing the takeover 
movement, antitakeover techniques, and the market’s adaptive response to 
antitakeover devices). 
 157 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43; Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196; 
Donaldson & Davis, supra note 62, at 52. 
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outside lawyers, independent accountants, credit rating 
agencies, securities analysts, and governmental agencies, to 
monitor executive misconduct in connection with the well-
publicized scandals involving major corporations and 
investment funds in the past decade.158 In addition, the recent 
revelation of the common practice of backdating executive stock 
options159 suggests that endowing CEOs with stocks and stock 
options does not necessarily align executive and shareholder 
interests; instead, it may exacerbate executive greed and 
prompt executive mismanagement.160 
C. Weighing the Theoretical Arguments About Duality 
Weighing the theoretical arguments for and against 
duality is not an easy task. Some would argue that the 
weighing analysis should be left to each corporation because 
the costs and benefits of different governance structures may 
vary among companies, resulting in different optimal 
governance structures for each company.161 For example, some 
scholars believe that companies often use the Chair title as an 
  
 158 See CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 510-27 (discussing the roles of external 
monitors in the Enron and WorldCom corporate scandals); Kara Scannell, The Madoff 
Fraud: SEC Botched Inquiries into Madoff Scheme, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at C3 
(summarizing an SEC inspector general report’s finding that the SEC “botched 
numerous opportunities to uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, in part because of 
an inexperienced staff and delays in examinations”). See generally ENRON: CORPORATE 
FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) 
(collecting works by various scholars and experts in the field of corporate governance 
regarding the failures of internal and external gatekeepers and the background events 
surrounding the collapse of Enron).  
 159 See Richard Hill, Cox: SEC Probing over 100 Cases Involving Reporting; 
New Rules Halt Slide, 38 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1567, 1567 (Sept. 18, 2006) 
(backdating stock options “involves misrepresenting the date that an option is granted 
so that it appears to be awarded at a time when the underlying stock price is at a low 
point, thereby maximizing the potential profit to be gained when the stock option is 
exercised at a later date”); SEC Is Probing More than 100 Cases Involving Possible 
Fraud in Option Reporting, 75 U.S. L.W. 2135, 2136 (Sept. 12, 2006) (recognizing that 
although SOX requires real-time reporting of stock option grants, backdating has 
continued where options are filed late and not in compliance with statutory 
requirements). 
 160 See Ramirez, supra note 59, at 366-67 (opining that the practice of 
backdating stock options seems “more about the crass enrichment of executives than 
creating any incentive for performance”); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 434 
(discussing the lack of consensus on whether increasing managerial ownership of 
company stock increases the alignment of management’s interests with those of outside 
shareholders). 
 161 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 197; Boyd, supra note 31, at 309; see also 
Karmel, supra note 78, at 3 (advocating against “[a] one size fits all command and 
control corporate governance regulation” because it “would stifle the experimentation 
that leads to good governance practices”). 
94 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
internal incentive mechanism for a new CEO.162 According to 
this view, most of the companies that have separate CEOs and 
Chairs are in a transitional succession process of testing new 
CEOs who will eventually be awarded the Chair title.163 These 
scholars caution against requiring companies to separate the 
CEO and Chair positions because doing so would compel 
companies to change their internal succession processes and 
CEO incentive systems.164 
Viewed in a different light, however, duality may not be 
the result of a deliberate succession planning process, but 
instead may be a signal that the company lacks a process for 
succession planning and for developing future leaders to run 
the company beyond the tenure of the current CEO-Chair.165 
Governance observers who take this view explain duality as the 
result of agency problems that arise when the board, beholden 
to the powerful individual holding both the CEO and Chair 
positions, fails to plan for leadership succession.166 
Another argument in support of letting each company 
decide for itself is that the decision to combine or separate the 
CEO and Chair positions is a strategic decision in response to 
external pressures167 and competitive uncertainty, such as the 
availability of resources in the industry, the level of instability 
or volatility in the industry, and the amount of competition in 
the industry.168 According to this argument, a company that 
operates in a highly competitive environment would prefer the 
consolidation of leadership power and the faster decision-
making process that a duality governance structure provides.169 
When leadership is concentrated in a combined CEO-Chair, the 
corporation may respond to changing business conditions more 
quickly and cohesively, and the benefits of a fast and unified 
response outweigh the potential agency costs of duality.170 
Conversely, a corporation that operates in a stable 
environment has less need for a powerful CEO and more time 
  
 162 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 192, 207, 209. 
 163 Id.  
 164 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 192. 
 165 See Harris & Helfat, supra note 71, at 901 (suggesting that combining the titles 
of president, chief executive, and board chair indicates a lack of succession planning). 
 166 See id. at 903 (discussing investor concerns about lack of succession 
planning when companies consolidate leadership titles). 
 167 Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 225. 
 168 Boyd, supra note 31, at 305-06. 
 169 Id. at 305. 
 170 Id. 
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for consensus decision making.171 Thus, without the need for 
decision speed, the company would want to install an 
independent Chair to minimize the potential agency costs of 
managerial abuse.172 
There are weaknesses in the contention that each 
company should be permitted to adopt its choice of governance 
structure in order to respond appropriately to the level of 
external pressures that the company faces. In the same way 
that the levels of external pressure are not the same for all 
companies, the level of external pressure for any one company 
is not likely to remain the same for an extended period of time 
or for the entire life of that company.173 Accordingly, it would be 
expected that companies change their top leadership structure 
over time as they go through periods of high external 
uncertainty (where the companies would opt for a unified 
duality structure) or low external pressures (where the 
companies would adopt an independent leadership structure). 
But empirical studies do not indicate that companies 
consciously choose their leadership structure as a strategic 
response to different levels of external pressure. For example, 
in a study of 181 companies for the five-year period from 1986 
to 1991, researchers found that less than one-third of these 
companies changed their leadership structure by combining or 
separating the CEO and Chair positions during the sample 
period.174 These data suggest that more than two-thirds of the 
companies either experienced the same level of external 
pressures during the five-year sample period or, despite 
experiencing changing levels of competitive demands during 
those years, did not consider adopting or abandoning duality as 
a strategic response.  
Furthermore, if companies facing competitive pressure 
strategically choose duality for its fast and unified decision-
making process, we should see a general increase in the 
  
 171 Id. 
 172 Id. 
 173 See BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 145-59 (2006) (describing the spurts 
and stops in the growth of the economy and business enterprises in the United States). 
 174 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 45. Of the sample, 12 of the companies (6.6%) 
had separate CEO and Chair positions over the entire sample period, 111 of the 
companies (61.3%) had combined roles over the entire sample period, and 58 of the 
companies (32%) changed their leadership structure to or away from duality during the 
sample period. Id. Another study of 671 companies finds that 94 of these companies 
(14%) changed their leadership structure by combining or separating the CEO and 
Chair positions during the two-year period from 1978 to 1980. Harrison et al., supra 
note 1, at 226.  
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number of companies choosing to consolidate their CEO and 
Chair positions—due to the need to respond to the generally 
increasing complexity and competitive nature of business both 
in the United States and globally.175 However, as discussed in 
Part II, it appears from various surveys that the trend in 
leadership structure has been a decrease in duality and an 
increase in separating the CEO and Chair positions. Although 
duality remains the dominant leadership governance structure 
in the United States, this dominance has decreased from a 
level of approximately 80% of the companies in the early 1990s 
to a level of approximately 60% of the companies in more 
recent years.176 In light of the increasingly complex and 
competitive nature of domestic and global business activities, 
the data showing decreasing duality refute the argument that 
duality is a corporate strategy to respond to heightened 
business complexity and competitiveness. 
The discussion in this section thus far has focused on 
the countervailing considerations to letting each company 
make its own decision about duality. The article now evaluates 
the theoretical arguments about duality to determine which 
leadership structure better supports the directors’ fundamental 
responsibilities to oversee business operations and monitor 
management conduct. Viewed from this analytical framework, 
the theoretical arguments suggest that companies should 
separate the CEO and Chair positions.  
Separating the CEO and Chair positions provides a 
governance framework better suited to the fulfillment of the 
directors’ management and monitoring responsibilities. Duality 
may enhance the board’s performance of its management 
responsibilities because a CEO-Chair brings to the board a 
deep knowledge about the company, and duality permits clear-
cut authority in one combined CEO-Chair that enables 
consistent and timely decision making by the company.177 The 
knowledge and information advantage of duality, however, 
diminishes when the company can put in place a nonexecutive 
  
 175 See Jacket Cover of THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2005) 
(“And with this ‘flattening’ of the globe, which requires us to run faster in order to stay 
in place, has the world gotten too small and too fast for human beings and their 
political systems to adjust in a stable manner?”); Berg & Smith, supra note 129, at 34 
(“The complexities of managing the modern corporation have been noted by many 
observers.”). 
 176 See supra Part II. 
 177 See supra Part III.A. 
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Chair that has long served on the board.178 Any confusion about 
the line of authority and accountability may also be mitigated 
by clearly delineating and communicating the division of 
responsibilities between the CEO and the Chair.179 
Furthermore, the consistency of decisions resulting from 
duality’s unified command structure may be detrimental if it 
renders the company resistant or slow to change strategies in 
order to meet evolving business conditions.180 
While a combined CEO-Chair may facilitate collegiality 
and consensus between the executive and director groups—
thereby enhancing the board’s deliberation and decision-
making process—any potential benefit that a collegial 
environment might bring to the board’s management function 
may come at the expense of the board’s monitoring function.181 
The cordial and deferential attitude that often prevails in the 
corporate boardroom may inhibit the objectivity and healthy 
vigilance that directors need to maintain while making conflict-
of-interest decisions involving senior management or other 
strategic decisions affecting the company.182 For example, the 
supportive and accommodating relationship that existed on the 
Enron board of directors was regarded as a contributing factor 
in the board’s failure to detect and prevent the financial fraud 
perpetrated by Enron’s top executives.183 As an investigation 
committee of the United States Senate reported:  
Enron board members uniformly described internal Board relations 
as harmonious . . . . The Directors also described a good working 
relationship with Enron management. Several had close personal 
relationships with Board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer 
(CEO) Kenneth L. Lay. All indicated they had possessed great 
respect for senior Enron officers, trusting the integrity and 
competence of Mr. Lay; President and Chief Operating Officer (and 
  
 178 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 199-200. 
 179 MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 19. 
 180 See Boyd, supra note 31, at 301 (pointing to examples where duality may 
have resulted in the company’s inability or unwillingness to adopt strategic changes). 
 181 See MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 19 (“[C]ombining the roles fosters 
a more friendly board environment, just as it encourages more complacent boards.”); 
Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431 (explaining that corporate boards that prize 
collegiality over objectivity may fail to scrutinize and discipline executives).  
 182 See MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 19 (“While mindless animosities 
and ego contests in the boardroom can be counterproductive, directors who applaud 
and rubberstamp all actions of the CEO without asking difficult questions are not 
fulfilling their duties.”). 
 183 See CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 491-510 (describing the Enron scandal). 
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later CEO) Jeffrey K. Skilling; Chief Financial Officer Andrew S. 
Fastow . . . .184 
The Enron failure exemplifies the risk that a board committed 
to being friendly and harmonious to inside directors and other 
inside executives will ignore or downplay the red flags of 
management misconduct. 
Whereas duality may enhance the board’s management 
function, but hinder its oversight responsibilities, separating 
the CEO and Chair positions may enable the board to fulfill 
both its management and monitoring roles. Having a 
nonexecutive Chair may facilitate the board’s management and 
decision-making process by assuring appropriate information 
and topics are put forth to the board for consideration.185 In 
addition, a nonexecutive Chair may bring an outside 
perspective and fresh insights to assist the board in its 
deliberation and decision making.186 
Separating the top executive and board roles may also 
provide directors with an environment more conducive to 
carrying out their oversight responsibilities. A nonexecutive 
Chair may be more likely to provide the board with information 
about—and to include in the board agenda—matters that raise 
questions about management judgment or questions that 
management may be reluctant to address.187 In addition, a 
nonexecutive Chair is more likely to provide—and also more 
likely to encourage other directors to provide—an objective 
evaluation of executive performance.188 Such objectivity is 
necessary for the board to carry out its tasks of disciplining 
  
 184 See id. at 498 (citation omitted). 
 185 See Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082 (commenting that the 
chairperson of the board has control over both the agenda and content of board 
meetings); Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 431 (explaining that executives may 
attempt to cover up their negative qualities or low performance by withholding 
relevant information from the board). 
 186 Clark, supra note 5, at 300; Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164. 
 187 See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of 
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 
146 U. PA. L. REV. 101, 139-46 (1997) (explaining that senior executives may be 
motivated to avoid reporting their suboptimal decisions, mistakes, and failures due to 
the concern that such reports may reflect poorly on them); Walsh & Seward, supra note 
21, at 431 (explaining that executives may attempt to cover up their negative qualities 
or low performance by controlling the board’s meeting agenda and withholding relevant 
information from the board). 
 188 See Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43 (explaining that duality may result in 
“the board’s difficulty in critically evaluating management performance and exercising 
independent judgment”). 
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managerial inefficiencies and misconduct that destroy 
shareholder value.189 
A separate Chair thus gives the board a stronger chance 
of reining in agency problems inherent in the separation of 
corporate control and ownership—problems that are likely to 
be exacerbated when ultimate directorial and executive power 
reside in one individual. A useful analogy is that, in corporate 
governance, as in political government, a system of checks and 
balances is the best protection against abuse of power.190 The 
theoretical arguments on duality suggest that separating the 
CEO and Chair positions allows the board to better exert its 
management and oversight authority in furtherance of 
shareholder interests.  
Some may contest the notion that separating the CEO 
and Chair roles would facilitate performance of the board’s 
management and monitoring roles and would thus better serve 
shareholder interests. These skeptics may point to the fact 
that, although technically elected by shareholders, all directors 
are actually selected by management and are therefore not 
truly independent from management when exercising the 
directors’ decision-making and oversight responsibilities.191 
However, it is difficult to argue that just because some 
directors’ independence may be compromised, we might as well 
give up on objectivity altogether and just let the CEO also chair 
the board. Moreover, questioning whether any director is truly 
independent from management does not advance the case for 
duality because supporters of duality often argue that “the 
danger of shareholder harm from combined titles can be 
counter-balanced by effective independent outside 
directors . . . .”192 
In sum, duality may bring some benefits to the board’s 
management role, but duality also carries substantial risks to 
the board’s monitoring function. Having a nonexecutive Chair, 
on the other hand, appears to bring considerable benefits to the 
  
 189 Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 790.  
 190 Paula L. Rechner & Dan R. Dalton, The Impact of CEO as Board 
Chairperson on Corporate Performance: Evidence vs. Rhetoric, 3 ACAD. MGMT. 
EXECUTIVES 141, 141 (1989) [hereinafter Rechner & Dalton 1989 Study]. 
 191 See Brown, supra note 30, at 1113 (“Directors who displeased a CEO often 
found it difficult to keep their seats on the board, which made it hard for the directors 
to maintain independence from the CEO.”); Gordon, supra note 6, at 1496 (noting that 
directors may feel a sense of loyalty and gratitude to the CEO who helped to put them 
on the board); Worrell et al., supra note 18, at 501 (“[O]utside directors are often 
chosen by the CEO and may be aligned to management interests.”). 
 192 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 196. 
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board in both its management and monitoring responsibilities. 
The risks that a nonexecutive Chair may have less knowledge 
about the inner working of the company than a CEO-Chair, or 
that a nonexecutive Chair may be less adept at creating a 
collegial atmosphere between management and the board, can 
be alleviated without much difficulty. A board with a separate 
Chair can still benefit from the CEO’s knowledge and expertise 
about the company, and from the CEO’s ability to facilitate a 
collaborative relationship between management and the board, 
by having the CEO serve as a director on the board—just not in 
the Chair position.  
Efforts to alleviate the potential loss of executive 
expertise and board collegiality that may arise from having a 
nonexecutive Chair appear to be more manageable than 
attempting to mitigate the agency costs of duality. The board’s 
objective monitoring of management performance is essential 
for the protection of shareholder interests. The potential 
managerial inefficiencies and misconduct that may result from 
weak oversight and ineffective monitoring by a CEO-Chair far 
outweigh any potential loss of knowledge and collegiality on 
the board that is led by a nonexecutive Chair. 
IV.  EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON DUALITY 
A number of studies provide statistical evidence about 
the impact of CEO duality on corporate performance, as 
measured by financial and nonfinancial metrics. The following 
discussion focuses on the research findings that have been 
offered to advance or reject the notion that duality, being the 
dominant corporate governance structure in the United States, 
is the optimal governance structure to further shareholder 
interests. Much of the empirical evidence suggests that 
separating the CEO and Chair positions has a positive effect on 
the financial and nonfinancial performance of the company. 
A. Evidence Supporting a Combined Position 
1. Nonfinancial Measures of Corporate Performance  
Kesner, Victor, and Lamont (1985). This study examines 
the relationship between duality and the company’s 
2010] TO BE OR NOT TO BE BOTH CEO AND BOARD CHAIR 101 
involvement in illegal activities.193 The study’s sample includes 
274 companies that were continuously listed on the Fortune 
500 and that consistently maintained a governance structure 
that either separated or combined the roles of the CEO and 
board Chair during the period from 1980 through 1984.194 Of the 
sample, 245 (89%) of the companies had one individual serving 
both as CEO and board Chair, and 29 (11%) of the companies 
had two individuals serving in the separate positions.195 The 
study focuses on the sample companies’ involvement in price 
discrimination, tying arrangements, price fixing, monopoly, 
conspiracy, and other violations of antitrust laws and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act.196 The study tallies the number 
of times in which the sample companies were found guilty in 
litigated cases, were subject to consent decrees in nonlitigated 
cases, or were charged in cases where the court found 
substantial merits to the charges.197 
The number of illegal acts over the test period ranges 
from zero to seventeen occurrences for each company in the 
sample, with a mean of less than one occurrence for all 
companies in the sample, and a mean of three occurrences for 
those companies that were involved in some types of illegal 
activities.198 Without giving specific data, the researchers 
conclude that “firms where one individual serves as both CEO 
and chairman are no more likely to be associated with illegal 
acts than those firms in which separate individuals hold these 
positions.”199 
2. Financial Measures of Corporate Performance 
Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma (1985). This study 
focuses on the relationship between duality and financial 
health of twenty-one pairs of companies in the retail industry.200 
In each pair, one company failed during the period from 1970 to 
  
 193 See Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 792-93 (hypothesizing that companies 
that combine the CEO and Chair positions are more likely to commit illegal acts than 
companies that separate the positions). 
 194 Id. at 793-94. 
 195 Id. at 795. 
 196 Id. at 793. 
 197 Id. at 794. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Id. at 796. 
 200 Rajeswararao S. Chaganti, Vijay Mahajan & Subhash Sharma, Corporate 
Board Size, Composition and Corporate Failures in Retailing Industry, 22 J. MGMT. 
STUD. 400, 408 (1985). 
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1976, and the other company of comparable type and size in the 
pair did not fail during that period.201 The study defines a 
“failed” company as one that has filed for bankruptcy under 
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.202 The study controls for 
general economic and industry-specific conditions to isolate 
their effects on firm failures.203 Recognizing that conditions 
leading to corporate failure take shape over time, the study 
collects data on whether the companies in each pair combine or 
separate their CEO and Chair positions during the five-year 
period prior to the failure of the failed company in the pair.204 
The study finds that when comparing the two sample 
groups—companies that failed and companies that did not 
fail—there are not statistically significant differences in 
whether these companies separated or combined their CEO 
and Chair positions.205 Data collected for the sample period 
show that in each of the five years, between ten and twelve of 
the twenty-one companies that eventually failed had separated 
their CEO and Chair positions.206 Similarly, for the twenty-one 
comparable companies that did not fail, between nine and 
twelve companies had separated their CEO and Chair 
positions.207 Acknowledging the limited focus of the study on a 
small number of companies in the retailing industry, the 
researchers conclude that duality is “not likely to make a 
difference to the chances of corporate failure.”208 
Donaldson and Davis (1991). This study analyzes the 
financial performance of 321 companies, including large 
Fortune 500 companies and smaller corporations in seven 
different industries.209 Of the sample group, 76% of the 
companies had a combined CEO-Chair structure, and 24% of 
the companies had different individuals serve in the CEO and 
Chair roles.210 The study compares the companies’ return on 
  
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. at 405. 
 203 Id. at 408. 
 204 Id. at 409-10.  
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 207 Id.  
 208 Id. at 414. 
 209 Donaldson & Davis, supra note 62, at 54. 
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equity and gain in shareholder wealth for the three years from 
1985 to 1987.211 
The study finds that the average return on equity was 
14.75% for companies with a dual CEO-Chair and 11.49% for 
companies with a separate Chair.212 The study considers this 
difference in return on equity as statistically significant.213 
Controlling for industry effects, the study also finds that the 
dual CEO-Chair structure was associated with higher levels of 
average return on equity than the separate Chair structure, 
although the difference was reduced to 2.38%.214 Data from the 
study show no statistically significant difference, with and 
without controlling for industry effects, between the gain in 
shareholder wealth of corporations that combined the CEO-
Chair positions and corporations that separated these roles.215 
Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996). Several researchers, 
using a sample of 181 Fortune 500 companies and a five-year 
sample period from 1986 to 1991, focus their study on the 
financial performance of companies that changed their 
governance structure to or from duality, as well as the long-
term financial performance of companies that consistently 
maintained either of the governance structures.216 The 
researchers categorize the sample companies in three groups: 
111 companies (61.3%) had combined roles over the entire 
sample period, 12 companies (6.6%) had separate CEO and 
Chair positions over the entire sample period, and 58 
companies (32%) changed their leadership structure to or away 
from duality during the sample period.217 The researchers 
compare the effects on stock price following an announcement 
of change in governance structure, changes in return on 
common equity (“ROE”) and return on total assets (“ROA”) 
following a change in governance structure, and the industry-
  
 211 Id. at 55. Return on equity is “profit generated on shareholder funds,” and 
gains in shareholder wealth include “the capital gains from share price appreciation 
plus dividends, for holding the share for three years from 1985 . . . expressed relative to 
the initial price . . . paid to acquire the stock in 1985.” Id. 
 212 Id. at 56. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 58. 
 216 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 44-45. 
 217 Id. at 45. Another study of 671 companies finds that ninety-four of that 
study’s sample group (14%) changed their leadership structure by combining or 
separating the CEO and Chair positions during the two-year period from 1978 to 1980. 
Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 211, 216, 226.  
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adjusted market value added ratios (“MVA”) during the five-
year sample period for all three groups of companies.218 
Results from this study reveal no significant effect on 
stock price upon announcement of a change in leadership 
structure, whether from duality to nonduality or from 
nonduality to duality.219 The study also finds no measurable 
effect on ROE or ROA in the two-year period following a change 
in governance structure, whether from duality to nonduality or 
from nonduality to duality.220 Similarly, when comparing the 
long-term performance of companies that maintained duality or 
nonduality over the entire test period, the study finds no 
significant evidence that duality affects financial performance, 
as measured by MVA.221 Pointing to the lack of any significant 
difference in financial performance due to a status change 
toward or away from duality, and no significant difference in 
long-term financial performance between companies that had 
CEO-Chairs and companies that had nonexecutive Chairs, the 
researchers conclude that the call to abolish duality is more of 
a “symbolic way of ‘signaling’ that the board is effectively 
exercising its governance role . . . than an effective way of 
motivating fundamental changes in firm performance.”222 
Brickley, Coles, and Jarell (1997). This study focuses on 
the impact of duality on the stock returns and return on capital 
of 628 large U.S. companies contained in the 1988 Forbes 
survey of corporate executives.223 Of this group, 535 companies 
  
 218 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 44. Market value added ratio is “an 
approximation of Tobin’s Q ratio” and is calculated as “the market value of debt, 
preferred equity and common equity capitalization less the book value of a firm’s entire 
capitalization, adjusted for past write-offs of capital.” Id. at 48. For comparative 
purposes, a higher MVA reflects better operating performance. Id. 
 219 Id. at 46-47. 
 220 Id. at 47. 
 221 Id. at 49-50. Although the study’s results indicate that companies that 
change their leadership structure have higher changes in market value added ratios, 
the researchers note that the changes typically involve changing from nonduality to 
duality and thus the resulting changes in market value added ratios for these 
companies may not reflect the impact of duality on firm performance but instead may 
reflect a “passing the baton” process whereby CEOs who have demonstrated their 
ability are awarded the additional title of board chair. Id. at 50. Accord Brinkley et al., 
supra note 25. 
 222 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 51. 
 223 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 197-98, 202 tbl.4 (the survey contains data 
on 661 firms, but in calculating statistics pertinent to this article, thirty-three firms 
are eliminated from the original sample due to a lack of a board chairperson). Return 
on capital is “income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus 
interest and minority interest (income account) all divided by invested capital (total) at 
end of prior fiscal year.” Id. at 210 tbl.9. 
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(85%) had CEO-Chairs, and 93 companies (15%) had CEOs who 
did not serve as board Chairs.224 
Results from the study show that for the year 1988, 
companies that combined their leadership positions had a 6.5% 
higher median stock return225 and a 3.5% higher median 
industry-adjusted stock return.226 Although companies that 
combined their CEO and Chair positions also had a 1.4% 
higher median return on capital in the year 1988,227 companies 
that separated their CEO and Chair positions had a 1.2% 
higher median industry-adjusted return on capital.228 
For the period from 1989 to 1991, while companies with 
a CEO-Chair had a 4.4% higher annualized median stock 
return,229 companies with a separate Chair had a 1.6% higher 
annualized median industry-adjusted stock return.230 The study 
finds similar results for return on capital during this period, 
whereby companies with a combined CEO-Chair had a 0.2% 
higher annualized median return on capital,231 but companies 
with a separate Chair had a 2.4% higher annualized median 
industry-adjusted return on capital.232 
Based on these mixed findings, the study concludes that 
companies that have one individual serving as both CEO and 
board Chair “do not necessarily have lower accounting returns” 
than companies that have two individuals occupy the separate 
CEO and Chair positions.233 Moreover, because the researchers 
  
 224 Id. at 198 tbl.1 (statistics that appear in table 1 were altered to reflect a 
sample size of 628 firms rather than the 661 firms used to calculate the statistics 
therein). 
 225 See id. at 210 (comparing 1988 median stock return of 10.6% for companies 
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 226 See id. (comparing 1988 median industry-adjusted stock return of -2.5% for 
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Industry benchmarks come from companies with the same four-digit SIC code. Id. 
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 232 See id. (comparing 1989-1991 annualized median industry-adjusted return 
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combined leaders). 
 233 Id. at 211. 
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recognize that the results reflect conflicting and mostly 
insignificant differences in stock return and return on capital, 
they urge caution in using the study’s findings to draw 
conclusions about the effect of duality on corporate financial 
profitability.234 
B. Evidence Supporting Separate Positions 
1. Nonfinancial Measures of Corporate Performance 
Harrison, Torres, and Kukalis (1988). This study 
analyzes the turnover rates for the CEO and Chair positions of 
671 large public manufacturing companies.235 Of this sample, 
72% of the companies consolidated the top leadership positions 
so that one individual held both the CEO and Chair positions.236 
The study determines turnover by examining whether the 
person who held the position in 1978 remained in the same 
position in 1980.237 Results from this study show that the 
turnover rate for CEOs who held only one position was 15%, 
whereas the turnover rate for CEOs who also held the position 
of board Chair was only 10%.238 
Other empirical studies that focus on CEO turnover in 
poorly performing companies also find that it is difficult to 
remove an underperforming CEO if that CEO also holds the 
position of board Chair.239 The consistent finding from studies 
on CEO turnover is that when the same individual holds both 
the CEO and Chair positions, the likelihood of the board 
dismissing the CEO decreases.240 
Mallette and Fowler (1992). This study compares the 
adoption of poison pills by companies that have a dual CEO-
Chair leadership structure and companies that have a separate 
  
 234 Id. at 210-11. 
 235 Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 216. 
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position during the test period. Id. 
 239 See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 2, 7 (citing Weisbach’s study in 
1988 and Goyal and Park’s study in 2002). 
 240 See Cannella & Lubatkin, supra note 136, at 782 (explaining the study’s 
finding that the “likelihood of dismissal is also higher for incumbent CEOs who do not 
hold the chairperson title”). 
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Chair.241 The sample population includes 673 industrial 
manufacturing companies, and the study period covers the 
peak poison pill adoption years of 1985 to 1988.242 Of the sample 
group, 477 companies (71%) had a combined CEO-Chair and 
196 companies (29%) had a separate Chair.243  
The study finds that 226 companies (34%) of the sample 
population had adopted poison pills by the end of 1988, and 447 
companies (66%) of the sample population did not have poison 
pills in place at the end of 1988.244 Results of the study show 
that a company with a nonexecutive Chair was much less likely 
to adopt a poison pill than a company with a dual CEO-Chair.245 
Of the 226 companies that adopted poison pills during the peak 
years of poison pill adoption, 200 companies (88%) were led by 
a CEO-Chair, and only 26 companies (12%) were led by a 
nonexecutive Chair.246 Although this study focuses only on the 
empirical association between duality and adoption of poison 
pills, the study cites other research that shows poison pills to 
have a negative effect on stock price.247 Thus, the study 
concludes that a company with a combined CEO-Chair is much 
more likely to adopt a poison pill, a defensive measure that has 
been shown by other studies to have the effect of discouraging 
or deterring takeover bids and resulting in a decrease in 
shareholder value.248 
Brickley, Coles, and Jarell (1997). This study compares 
the amount of compensation and the length of tenure of CEO-
Chairs and of CEOs who do not serve as Chairs.249 The study’s 
sample population includes 628 companies contained in the 
  
 241 Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, at 1010. 
 242 Id. at 1020-21. 
 243  Id. at 1022. 
 244 Id. at 1021.  
 245 Id. at 1023. Accord Finkelstein & D’Aveni, supra note 60, at 1082 (citing, 
with approval, the Mallette & Fowler study’s finding of a positive correlation between 
duality and adoption of poison pills). Other research also shows that a board led by a 
CEO-Chair is more likely to adopt poison pills and to resist takeover bids. See, e.g., 
Boyd, supra note 31, at 302 (noting that signs of CEO-Chairs’ ineffective governance 
include resistance to hostile takeovers and adoption of poison pills). 
 246 Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, at 1023. 
 247 Id. at 1011. See Walsh & Seward, supra note 21, at 439 (explaining that 
empirical studies show that a company’s stock price drops significantly upon the board’s 
announcement of the adoption of a poison pill, while the stock price rises upon the board’s 
announcement that the company has abandoned its plan to adopt a poison pill). 
 248 Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, at 1028. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, 
CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 612-14 (2002) (discussing the evidence that hostile 
takeovers result in increased shareholder wealth). 
 249 See Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 202 tbl.4 (presenting data on tenure 
and compensation classified by whether the CEO and Chair positions are combined). 
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1988 Forbes survey of corporate executives.250 Of this group, 535 
companies (85%) had CEO-Chairs, and 93 companies (15%) had 
CEOs who did not serve as board Chairs.251 
The study finds that both the compensation and tenure 
of the 535 CEO-Chairs were markedly higher than the 
compensation and tenure of the 93 CEOs who did not serve as 
board Chairs.252 Data from the study show that the median total 
compensation for CEOs who also served as board Chairs was 
approximately 46% higher than the median total compensation 
for CEOs who did not serve as board Chair.253 Similarly, 
whereas the median tenure for CEOs who also served as board 
Chairs was 6.92 years, the median tenure for CEOs who did 
not serve as board Chairs was only 2.92 years.254 
The study’s findings of higher compensation and longer 
tenure for the CEO-Chairs may be indicators of managerial 
entrenchment in the duality governance structure.255 By 
combining the top two leadership positions in one person, 
executive accountability is reduced, discharge for poor 
management performance is doubtful, and the combined leader 
is more likely to be able to extract additional compensation and 
stay in power longer than a CEO who has to answer to a 
separate board Chair.256 
A recent study by professors and researchers Bebchuk, 
Cremers, and Peyer provides further empirical evidence that 
combining the CEO and Chair positions may facilitate 
managerial entrenchment.257 Their study, in addition to 
providing evidence of entrenchment, also provides data on the 
  
 250 Id. at 197, 198 tbl.1 (the survey contained data on 661 firms, but in 
calculating the statistics pertinent to this article, thirty-three firms were eliminated 
from the original sample due to a lack of a board chairperson). 
 251 Id. at 198 tbl.1 (statistics that appear in table 1 were altered to reflect a 
sample size of 628 firms rather than the 661 firms used to calculate the statistics 
therein). 
 252 Id. at 202 tbl.4. 
 253 See id. (comparing a median of $675,000 in total compensation for CEOs 
and a median of $985,000 in total compensation for CEO-Chairs). Total compensation 
includes “salary, bonus, value of restricted stock, savings and thrift plans, and other 
benefits.” Id. at tbl.4. A potential cost of separating the CEO and Chair positions is the 
compensation for the independent chairperson. Id. at 195. See Brown, supra note 30, at 
1105 (explaining that directors who are also employees of the corporation generally do 
not receive additional compensation for their service on the board).  
 254 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 202 tbl.4. 
 255 Id. at 202. 
 256 See id. (acknowledging that tenure and compensation data for CEO-Chairs 
indicate that “combined titles might imply that the CEO is not accountable to 
shareholders and is seldom fired for poor performance”). 
 257 See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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financial performance of companies that are led by dominant 
chief executives such as CEOs who also serve as board 
Chairs.258  
Sanders and Carpenter (1998). This study analyzes the 
correlation between a company’s degree of internationalization 
and the likelihood that the company would combine its CEO 
and Chair positions.259 The study presents information that 
shows directors and officers of international firms operate in 
highly complex information processing and decision-making 
environments due to diverse cultural and competitive 
conditions.260 In addition, internationalization presents greater 
information processing requirements and monitoring problems 
because of the geographic dispersion of assets, operations, 
personnel, and management.261 International companies strive 
to control and cope with this informational and decision-
making complexity by creating a governance structure that 
efficiently processes information and effectively monitors 
executive actions.262 
The study hypothesizes that as a company’s degree of 
internationalization increases, the likelihood decreases that the 
company would have a dual CEO-Chair governance structure.263 
The sample population includes 258 companies in the 1992 
Standard & Poor’s 500.264 A company’s degree of 
internationalization was measured by its foreign sales, foreign 
production, and geographic dispersion.265 
The study’s findings indicate that the degree of a 
company’s internationalization is a significant predictor of 
whether the company has the same person or two individuals 
serve in the CEO and Chair positions.266 Results from the study 
  
 258 This article discusses Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer’s empirical study in 
more detail in Part IV.B.2, which analyzes the empirical evidence of financial benefits 
arising from separating the CEO and Chair positions.  
 259 Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 158.  
 260 See id. at 158-60 (citing various studies).  
 261 Id. at 171-72. 
 262 See id. at 158-60 (citing various studies). 
 263 Id. at 164. 
 264 Id. at 165. 
 265 Id. at 166. Foreign sales are represented by “the ratio of foreign sales to 
total sales and reflect a firm’s dependence on sales to foreign markets.” Id. Foreign 
production is represented by “foreign assets expressed as a percentage of total assets,” 
and geographic dispersion identifies the “number of countries in which a firm had 
subsidiaries, expressed as a percentage of the highest number of countries with 
subsidiaries represented in our sample.” Id. 
 266 Id. at 170. 
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suggest that companies with high degrees of 
internationalization are likely to implement a governance 
structure that amplifies communication channels and disperses 
responsibility among company leaders; the highly 
internationalized companies are not likely to consolidate power 
and responsibility into one combined CEO-Chair.267 Instead, 
these companies separate the CEO and Chair positions in order 
to improve the information available to the board and to 
enhance the board’s ability to control and monitor 
management.268 The study concludes that separation of the CEO 
and Chair positions may allow companies to cope with the high 
information processing and agency costs that result from a 
high level of internationalization.269 
2. Financial Measures of Corporate Performance 
Duality is often cited as a culprit of the decline in 
financial performance of large corporations,270 while the 
existence of a nonexecutive Chair is regarded as a reason for 
the competitive financial performance of other large 
corporations.271 For example, opponents of duality point to 
General Motors’s loss of $23.5 billion in 1992, together with its 
sizeable losses of market share and market value, as resulting 
from then-CEO-Chairman Roger Smith’s constraint on board 
oversight and restriction on board adoption of appropriate 
strategies to adapt to the competitive environment.272 
Another often cited anecdote about duality’s destruction 
of shareholder value involves General Motors’s payment of 
“greenmail”273 to Ross Perot, an outside director on General 
  
 267 Id. at 164, 169-73. See Berg & Smith, supra note 129, at 34 (“Unless some 
divisionalization occurs to improve information flows, the costs of monitoring and 
rewarding inputs (and activities) rise.”). 
 268 Sanders & Carpenter, supra note 31, at 164, 169-73. 
 269 Id. at 172. 
 270 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42; see also Boyd, supra note 31, at 301 
(“[D]uality has been blamed for poor performance and slow response to change” in large 
corporations.). 
 271 See, e.g., Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 43 (citing nonduality as the reason 
Compaq was able to “make appropriate strategic responses to a changing competitive 
environment”). 
 272 Id. at 42. 
 273 The corporate practice of paying a premium price to repurchase shares in 
order to be rid of a hostile shareholder is known as paying “greenmail” to the hostile 
shareholder. CHIAPPINELLI, supra note 3, at 244. Several empirical studies have 
documented the association between greenmail payments and negative stock returns 
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Motors’s board who was also a major shareholder of the 
company and a vocal critic of General Motors’s management.274 
Many criticized CEO-Chair Roger Smith for “muzzling” Ross 
Perot’s criticism of management when the CEO-Chair directed 
the company to buy out Perot’s shares at a premium price of 
$700 million.275 Similarly, supporters of separating the top 
leadership positions regard IBM’s loss of $5 billion in 1992, 
together with its substantial losses of market share and market 
value, as resulting from then-CEO-Chairman John Akers’s 
restraint on the board’s exercise of its own judgment to 
objectively evaluate management performance.276 
To contrast with the poor financial performance of 
General Motors and IBM under the duality leadership 
structure, supporters of a separate Chair point to Compaq 
Computer’s ability to perform competitively under the 
leadership of Ben Rosen, a nonexecutive Chair.277 Compaq’s 
board of directors, under the leadership of a separate Chair and 
over the strong objection of the company’s CEO, adopted a 
successful lower-priced product line to maintain its market 
share and remain competitive in the industry.278 In addition to 
these anecdotal cases linking duality with negative financial 
performance, several studies present empirical evidence that 
separating the CEO and Chair positions results in better 
corporate financial performance.  
Berg and Smith (1978). These researchers conducted 
one of the first empirical studies that tested the impact of 
duality on corporate financial performance.279 The sample 
population includes the entire group of Fortune 200 companies 
in twenty-three industries.280 Of the 200 companies in the 
sample group, about 59% had one individual serving in both 
the CEO and Chair roles, while approximately 41% had two 
separate leaders in these positions.281 The performance 
measures include stock price appreciation, return on equity, 
  
for nonparticipating shareholders of the companies making the payments. Walsh & 
Seward, supra note 21, at 439.  
 274 Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 42-43. 
 275 Id. at 42-43.  
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 43. 
 278 Id. 
 279 Berg & Smith, supra note 129, at 34. 
 280 Id. at 35. 
 281 Id. at 38 tbl.II (Table II contains information for only 199 of the Fortune 
200 companies; percentages are based on these 199 companies). 
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and return on investment during the test period of 1974 to 
1976.282 
Results from this study show that companies that 
combine their CEO and Chair positions experience significantly 
lower stock price appreciation and return on equity, and a 
modestly lower return on investment, than companies that 
separate the CEO and Chair positions.283 These findings suggest 
that companies that combine the CEO and Chair positions 
perform worse financially than companies that have an 
independent Chair.284 
Rechner and Dalton (1989 and 1991). This study 
examines the risk-adjusted stockholder return of 141 Fortune 
500 companies that kept their governance structures constant, 
either combining or separating the CEO and Chair positions, 
over the six-year period from 1978 to 1983.285 Of the 141 
companies in the sample group, 79% had one leader who served 
in both the CEO and Chair roles, and 21% had two leaders in 
these positions.286 
The first analysis of data in 1989 finds no statistically 
significant difference in risk-adjusted stockholder returns 
between companies with a combined CEO-Chair and 
companies with a separate Chair.287 The data show no 
significant difference in risk-adjusted stockholder return for 
any one single year of the sample period, and no significant 
difference in stock return for the entire six-year period, 
  
 282 Id. at 35. Stock price appreciation is “the change in the value of common 
stock,” return on equity is “(net income)/(stockholder equity),” and return on 
investment is “(price appreciation and stock dividend)/(book value of equity).” Id. at 38 
statistical appendix. 
 283 Id. at 39. The results as presented in Table A.1 on page 39 of the study, 
and reported here in this article, differ from the researchers’ summary of the results as 
discussed in the text on page 35 of the study. See id. at 35 (“For total return to 
investors, the impact on performance was significant and negative . . . .”). 
 284 Cf. id. at 35 (“It would be premature to conclude that unitary leadership 
reduces benefits to stockholders—although across all industries this was true for the 
return on book value in equity. These mixed results suggest that no general conclusion 
can be made, and further tests are called for.”). 
 285 Rechner & Dalton 1989 Study, supra note 190, at 142. The study specifies, 
“Stockholder return . . . comprises risk-adjusted, abnormal returns on common stocks. 
This approach takes into account the effects of both general market factors and 
differential risk levels on security returns. Thus, the measure reflects only those 
returns due to firm-specific factors.” Id.  
 286 Paula L. Rechner & Dan R. Dalton, CEO Duality and Organizational 
Performance: A Longitudinal Analysis, 12 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 155, 156 (1991) 
[hereinafter Rechner & Dalton 1991 Study]. 
 287 Rechner & Dalton 1989 Study, supra note 190, at 142. 
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between companies that had a combined CEO-Chair and 
companies that had a separate Chair.288 
When the researchers conducted a subsequent analysis 
of the same 141 companies over the same six-year period from 
1978 to 1983, focusing their research on the companies’ return 
on equity, return on investment, and profit margin, the results 
showed a negative relationship between duality and these 
performance measures.289 In these three financial measures of 
corporate performance, the companies that had two individuals 
serving in the CEO and Chair positions consistently and 
significantly outperformed companies that had one individual 
occupying both roles.290 
Pi and Timme (1993). This study investigates the 
variation in return on assets and production cost efficiency 
between companies that had one dual CEO-Chair and 
companies that had two individuals serve in these roles.291 The 
study focuses on a sample of 112 publicly traded bank-holding 
companies for the period from 1987 to 1990.292 Of the sample 
population, 93 banks (83%) had a combined CEO-Chair, and 19 
banks (17%) had a separate Chair.293 
Controlling for company size and other variables, the 
study’s results show that companies that had a separate Chair 
consistently and significantly outperformed companies that 
had a combined CEO-Chair in both measures of return on 
assets and production cost efficiency.294 From these results, the 
researchers suggest that the board’s monitoring function is not 
effective in a duality governance structure, with the 
consequence that the CEO-Chair may be less constrained from 
engaging in behavior that destroys shareholder value.295 
Boyd (1995). This study gathers data on leadership 
structure and financial performance of 192 public companies in 
twelve industries.296 The number of sample companies in each 
  
 288 Id. 
 289 Rechner & Dalton 1991 Study, supra note 286, at 156-59. 
 290 Id. at 157. 
 291 Lynn Pi & Stephen G. Timme, Corporate Control and Bank Efficiency, 17 
J. BANKING & FIN. 515, 518 (1993). Return on assets is “after-tax net income divided by 
total assets,” and production cost efficiency is “derived [using] a stochastic frontier cost 
model” that examines each company’s costs, outputs, and prices. Id.  
 292 Id. at 517, 521. 
 293 Id. 
 294 Id. at 525-26. 
 295 Id. 
 296 Boyd, supra note 31, at 306. 
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industry ranges from twelve to twenty-two, and the percentage 
of sample companies with duality in each industry ranges from 
33% to 73%.297 Financial performance is measured as the 
average return on investment over the five-year period from 
1980 through 1984.298 The study results show that the effect of 
duality on financial performance varies across industry groups, 
but that combining the CEO and Chair positions is correlated 
with slightly lower corporate financial performance as 
measured by return on investment.299 
This study also includes a meta-analysis of the findings 
of seven other empirical studies published during the period 
from 1978 to 1993.300 In these seven studies, the sample 
population ranges from 42 to 800 companies.301 The seven 
studies focus on measures of financial performance, such as 
return on equity, return on investment, stock return, and profit 
margin.302 When aggregating the result statistics across these 
seven studies, the meta-analysis shows that separation of the 
CEO and Chair positions is associated with slightly higher 
financial performance across the aggregated financial 
performance measures.303 
Sundaramurthy, Mahoney, and Mahoney (1997). This 
study examines the relationship between board structure and 
stock market reaction to the company’s adoption of 
antitakeover provisions.304 The sample population includes 261 
companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500 that adopted 486 
antitakeover measures from 1984 to 1988, the crest of the 
takeover wave.305 The results show that “the market reacts less 
negatively to antitakeover provisions adopted by boards with a 
chairperson who is not the CEO than to antitakeover 
  
 297 Id. at 308. The smaller percentages of duality for some industries reflect 
the study’s inclusion of smaller companies, where duality is not as common as in larger 
companies. Id. at 307. 
 298 Id. 
 299 Id. at 308-09. 
 300 Id. at 302. The seven studies were conducted by Berg and Smith (1978); 
Chaganti, Mahajan, and Sharma (1985); Rechner and Dalton (1989 and 1991); 
Donaldson and Davis (1991); Mallette and Fowler (1992); and Cannella and Lubatkin 
(1993). Id. 
 301 Id. at 303.  
 302 Id. at 302-03.  
 303 Id. at 302.  
 304 Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 231. 
 305 Id. at 234. The antitakeover provisions include supermajority voting for 
mergers, classified board, fair price provisions, reduction of cumulative voting, anti-
greenmail provisions, and poison pills. Id. at 244-45. 
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provisions adopted by boards chaired by the CEO.”306 The 
researchers conclude that market reaction appears to be 
influenced by the leadership structure of the board and that 
investors regard a nonexecutive Chair as more capable of 
monitoring management actions and protecting shareholder 
interests than a combined CEO-Chair.307 
The study also finds that “the market reacts more 
negatively to antitakeover provisions adopted by outsider-
dominated boards than to antitakeover provisions adopted by 
boards” that are dominated by insiders.308 Thus, while the 
market views an outsider Chair as enhancing the ability of the 
board to monitor and protect shareholder interests, investors 
do not perceive the same value in other outside directors.309 
Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2007). This study focuses 
on the relationship between CEO centrality and the value and 
behavior of public firms.310 Data for the study cover 12,011 
companies in twelve industries for the years 1993 through 
2004.311 The study refers to CEO centrality as the relative 
importance of the CEO to other top executives within the 
company in terms of ability, contribution, or power.312 CEO 
centrality is measured by the “CEO’s pay slice (CPS),” which is 
the CEO’s compensation as a percentage of the aggregate top-
five compensations in the company.313 CPS is deemed to be the 
product of several variables relating to corporate governance, 
including whether the CEO also has the dual role as board 
Chair.314 
Results from the study show that greater CEO 
centrality, or higher CPS, relates to firm performance in 
several ways, including lower firm value as measured by 
  
 306 Id. at 239. 
 307 Id. at 239-40. The study’s suggestion—that investor trust in the board’s 
monitoring role is enhanced when companies separate the CEO and Chair positions—is 
consistent with research findings that corporate boards that are led by a nonexecutive 
Chair tend to be sued less often. Id. at 240. 
 308 Id. 
 309 See id. (“[T]he market not only does not take into account the monitoring 
role of outsiders but actually discounts their presence.”). 
 310 See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 78, at 1-5 (concluding that CEO 
centrality is an aspect of corporate governance that merits attention from researchers).  
 311 Id. at 8. 
 312 Id. at 1, 6. 
 313 Id. Executive compensation includes “the total compensation to each 
executive, including salary, bonus, other annual pay, the total value of restricted stock 
granted that year, the Black-Scholes value of stock options granted that year, long-
term incentive payouts, and all other total compensation.” Id. at 7. 
 314 Id. at 1. 
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industry-adjusted Tobin’s Q,315 lower industry-adjusted return 
on assets,316 lower stock returns accompanying acquisition 
announcements,317 and lower CEO turnover controlling for 
length of service and performance.318 The study finds that the 
high CPS level may be the result of a CEO who uses his power 
to dominate the board and the company’s decision making and 
to raise his CPS above an optimal level.319 Results from the 
study also rule out the hypothesis that the correlation between 
high CPS and low firm value is explained by the tendency of 
low value companies to adopt high levels of CPS.320 Thus, the 
researchers explain, “having a high excess CPS might reflect 
agency and governance problems that in turn bring about a 
reduction in firm value.”321 
From this study, one may expect that, because high 
CEO centrality is associated with low firm value, a CEO who 
gets high CPS but achieves low financial value for the company 
is likely to be removed, as the board is likely to be dissatisfied 
with a highly compensated CEO who fails to create high value 
for the company.322 Contrary to expectation, however, the study 
finds that the association between high CPS and low firm value 
is most prominent in companies with high entrenchment—
companies where the CEO is “relatively insulated from market 
discipline and the threat of removal.”323 The study’s results 
indicate that the more dominant a CEO is within a company’s 
governance structure, the less impact market performance has 
  
 315 Id. at 1, 3, 11. Tobin’s Q is “the market value of equity plus the book value 
of assets minus the book value of equity, all divided by the book value of assets.” Id. at 
8, 40, 41, 46, 49. 
 316 Id. at 1, 3. Industry-adjusted return on assets is “the return on assets 
computed as net income divided by book value of assets adjusted by the median ROA of 
the firms in Compustat in a given four-digit SIC industry and year.” Id. at 8-9, 40. 
 317 Id. at 1, 3. The study finds that “high-CPS firms tend to make worse 
acquisition decisions as judged by the market’s reaction to acquisition announcements. 
If the acquiring firm has higher CPS, the stock return accompanying the acquisition 
announcement is lower and more likely to be negative.” Id. at 3. The researchers 
concluded that “one potential reason for the lower valuation of firms with high CPS is 
that high-CPS firms make acquisitions viewed less favorably by the market and, in 
particular, are more likely to make acquisitions viewed as value-destroying by the 
market.” Id. at 26. 
 318 Id. at 4. 
 319 Id. at 2, 10, 13. 
 320 Id. at 2. 
 321 Id. 
 322 See id. at 20 (discussing whether CEO turnover is related to CPS). 
 323 Id. at 21. 
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on that CEO’s tenure.324 Based on these findings, the 
researchers suggest that the CEO’s dominance, of which 
duality may be a contributing factor,325 exaggerates agency 
problems that may lower the financial performance of the 
company and may make the removal and replacement of the 
CEO more difficult or unlikely.326 
Balsam and Upadhyay (2009). This recent study 
examines the impact that duality—and the announcement that 
the company is moving toward or away from duality—has on 
corporate financial performance.327 The study’s sample 
population includes the 1,500 companies in the ExecuComp 
database of companies during the ten-year period from 1996 to 
2005.328 The percentage of companies in the sample population 
that had a separate Chair ranged from 24% in 1996 to almost 
40% in 2005.329 
Results from the study show that separating the CEO 
and board Chair positions correlates with significantly 
improved financial performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q, 
return on assets, and ratio of sales to assets.330 The study also 
finds that, at times, appointment of a lead director has no effect 
and, at other times, has a negative effect on these three 
measures of corporate financial performance.331 Thus, the 
researchers conclude “that having a lead director is not a 
substitute for having a separate chair.”332 
The study also examines the stock market reaction to 
the 408 announcements of a change in leadership structure 
made by the companies during the ten-year sample period.333 Of 
the group of announcements, 236 (58%) announced a move 
away from duality in that the combined CEO and Chair 
  
 324 See id. at 30 (concluding that “CEO turnover is less sensitive to firm 
specific returns for CEOs with a high industry-adjusted CPS”). 
 325 Id. at 6. 
 326 Id. at 29. 
 327 Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 3, 6. 
 328 Id. at 12, 38 tbl.1. The study includes one analysis that excludes utilities 
and financial services firms, and another analysis that includes utilities and financial 
services firms; both analyses yield similar results. Id. at 12 n.11. 
 329 Id. at 15-16. 
 330 Id. at 4-6, 18-19, 21. Tobin’s Q is measured as “(Market value of equity + 
Book value of debt)/(Book value of assets).” Id. at 13. 
 331 Id. at 4-6, 18, 21. 
 332 Id. at 32. 
 333 Id. at 29. The study excludes announcements that were accompanied by 
other material events such as “mergers, dividend declaration, splits, tender offers, new 
product announcements, charter amendments or substantial changes in capital 
structure.” Id. 
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positions were being separated, and 172 (42%) announced a 
move toward duality in that the separated positions were being 
combined.334 The study’s results show positive stock market 
returns are more likely to follow the announcement of a 
decision to separate the CEO and Chair positions than the 
announcement of a decision to combine the positions.335 
C. Weighing the Empirical Evidence 
Much of the empirical evidence on both the financial 
and nonfinancial effects of duality weighs in favor of separating 
the positions of CEO and Chair. Although the studies use 
different measures of corporate performance—some studies 
focusing only on large companies or specific industries, and 
some studies employing no control for other governance 
variables—when viewed together, they provide a convincing 
case that separating the CEO and Chair positions has a 
positive impact on corporate performance from both financial 
and nonfinancial perspectives.  
Although grouped under Part IV.A as “Evidence 
Supporting Combined Positions,” the studies discussed in that 
section do not provide much empirical evidence that duality 
results in improved financial or nonfinancial performance—
only that duality does not result in worse performance. With 
the exception of the Donaldson study in 1991, the studies in 
Part IV.A find that there is no difference in performance 
between companies that have a combined CEO-Chair and those 
that have a separate Chair. The Donaldson study finds that 
only return on equity is higher in dual CEO-Chair companies 
than in companies with a separate Chair, and that there is no 
difference between the two groups of companies with respect to 
gain in shareholder wealth.336 All other studies in that section 
find no difference between companies that have a combined 
CEO-Chair and those that have a separate Chair with respect 
to involvement in illegal activities, bankruptcy filings, stock 
returns, return on equity, return on assets, return on capital, 
and market value added. Lacking the positive evidence to 
  
 334 Id. It should be noted the original sample size was comprised of 512 
announcements, 104 of which were lost “due to incomplete returns on data.” Id. 
 335 Id. at 6, 29-30. Stock market returns include abnormal return, which is 
“computed after subtracting predicted from realized stock returns,” and excess return, 
which is “computed after subtracting the return on the value-weighted market index 
from the firm’s realized return.” Id. at 30. 
 336 Donaldson & Davis, supra note 62, at 56-58. 
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advocate affirmatively for the combined CEO-Chair structure, 
the studies only defensively protect duality in concluding that 
companies with a combined CEO-Chair are “no more likely” to 
underperform on nonfinancial measures337 and “do not 
necessarily” have lower financial returns than companies with 
a separate Chair.338 
The studies identified in Part IV.B as “Evidence 
Supporting Separate Positions” provide strong data that 
companies with nonduality perform better in both financial and 
nonfinancial metrics than companies with one individual 
occupying both roles. Several studies focus on the effect of 
duality on entrenchment indicators such as the adoption of 
antitakeover provisions, rates of CEO turnover, lengths of CEO 
tenure, and amounts of CEO compensation; data from these 
studies suggest that combining the CEO and Chair positions 
may increase the likelihood of entrenchment. For example, 
companies with a combined CEO-Chair are much more likely to 
adopt poison pills339 and less likely to oust a nonperforming 
CEO.340 Study results also indicate that the CEO-Chairs receive 
markedly higher compensation and longer tenure than the 
CEOs who do not also serve as the Chair.341 In addition, the 
studies—covering over 12,000 companies in more than twenty 
industries—provide compelling evidence that companies with a 
separate board Chair perform significantly better on financial 
measures such as stock returns, return on equity, return on 
assets, return on investment, and profit margin.  
The stock market also appears to favor the separation of 
the CEO and Chair positions. Results from several studies 
suggest that investors perceive companies that separate the 
positions to be better monitors of management and better 
advocates of shareholders than companies that combine the 
two positions. Thus, companies that announce they are 
separating the CEO-Chair structure experience significantly 
more positive stock returns than companies that announce they 
are combining the CEO and Chair positions.342 In addition, the 
market reacts less negatively to antitakeover provisions 
  
 337 Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 796; see also Chaganti et al., supra note 200, at 414.  
 338 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 211; see also Baliga et al., supra note 2, at 46-51.  
 339 Mallette & Fowler, supra note 3, at 1023. 
 340 Cannella & Lubatkin, supra note 136, at 782; Harrison et al., supra note 1, at 222.  
 341 Brickley et al., supra note 25, at 202. 
 342 Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 6, 30. 
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adopted by a board with a separate Chair than to those 
measures adopted by a board with a combined CEO-Chair.343 
The empirical evidence indicates not only that duality 
correlates with lower corporate performance and shareholder 
value, but also that the negative effects of duality cannot be 
eliminated simply by putting more outside directors on the 
board or by installing a lead director.344 It appears that the 
board Chair occupies a powerful and influential position in the 
corporate governance structure and that this individual’s 
independence from management is pivotal to the company’s 
performance.345 Thus, having a nonexecutive Chair appears to 
be more crucial than having a lead director or an outsider-
dominated board in reducing agency costs and enhancing 
shareholder value.346 
V.  STAKEHOLDERS’ VIEWS ON DUALITY 
The board is charged with management and monitoring 
responsibilities in order to serve the best interests of the 
corporation and its shareholders, but directors may also 
consider the interests of other stakeholders when making 
corporate decisions.347 The term “stakeholders” includes, in 
addition to shareholders, the corporation’s employees, 
  
 343 Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 237-40. 
 344 See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 4-6, 18-19, 21 (finding that 
although separation of the CEO and Chair positions correlates with higher financial 
performance, appointment of a lead director does not correlate with better financial 
results); Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 237-40 (finding that although the 
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boards than to antitakeover provisions adopted by boards with fewer outsiders.”). 
 345 See Clark, supra note 5, at 271 (explaining that some corporate governance 
experts urge companies to have a substantial minority of insiders on the board but 
insist that the board chair be an outside director); MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, 
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hierarchical signal of board leadership to fellow board members, management and 
shareowners alike.”); Ramirez, supra note 59, at 377 (“[T]here is powerful evidence that 
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 346 See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 32 (“[H]aving a lead director is 
not a substitute for having a separate chair.”); MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 8 
(“The lead director is better than nothing. But on a scale of 1 to 10, having a [non-
executive] chairman is 10, and having a lead director is about a 4.”); Sundaramurthy et 
al., supra note 20, at 240 (“[T]he market not only does not take into account the 
monitoring role of outsiders but actually discounts their presence.”). 
 347 Cf. Allen, supra note 28, at 279-81 (discussing the entity conception of 
corporations). 
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customers, and creditors; “stakeholders” may also include the 
community and environment in which the corporation 
operates.348 The term has been defined even more broadly to 
include “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by 
the achievement of the organization’s objectives.”349 Based on 
that broad definition, the list of stakeholders may be expanded 
to include “governments, competitors, consumer advocates, 
environmentalists, special interest groups, and the media.”350  
Executives and boards of directors of companies that 
have a dual CEO-Chair governance structure naturally oppose 
splitting the leadership positions.351 Some candidates for the 
CEO position in fact demand that they get the chairman’s seat 
along with the top executive spot.352 Reasons for opposing 
separation of the roles focus on the desire to have only one 
person in charge of the company. These reasons include 
preventing dilution of the CEO’s power to effectively lead the 
company, avoiding potential rivalry between the CEO and the 
Chair, and eliminating potential confusion about who is 
responsible for the company’s performance.353 As explained by 
an executive who supports combining the CEO and Chair 
positions, “They should be the same person. If they are not, the 
Chairman would be a figure-head or would usurp the role of 
the CEO.”354 
Directors of companies that have a nonexecutive Chair, 
on the other hand, have expressed strong support for splitting 
the position.355 The 2008 Public Company Governance Survey 
  
 348 Licht, supra note 28, at 651. 
 349 See id. at 722 (quoting R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A 
STAKEHOLDER APPROACH 46 (1984)). 
 350 Id. at 722. 
 351 Caggiano, supra note 51, at 5; Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, CEO 
and Board Chair Roles Held Jointly or Separately: Much Ado About Nothing?, 11 
ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVES 11, 11 (1997); MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 20; 
Worrell et al., supra note 18, at 499. See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 54 
(referencing the Exxon Mobil board’s recommendation that shareholders vote against a 
shareholder proposal to separate the CEO and Chair positions); Millstein & MacAvoy, 
supra note 30, at 1287 n.18 (noting that opposition to separation of the roles originates 
from management groups, including The Business Roundtable, a group of chief 
executives from large public companies). 
 352 Caggiano, supra note 51, at 5. See Lublin, supra note 57 (recounting 
Edward Breen’s desire for both the CEO and Chairman jobs at Tyco International). 
 353 Lorsch & Lipton, supra note 45, at 79; see also Caggiano, supra note 51, 
at 5 (separation may create rivalry between the roles); Daily & Dalton, supra note 351, 
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 354 Toda & McCarty, supra note 81, at 213. 
 355 MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 15. 
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conducted by the National Association of Corporate Directors 
shows that 72.8% of the directors serving on boards with a 
separate Chair believe that there is great benefit from splitting 
the CEO and Chair positions, while only 6.7% of the directors 
do not perceive a benefit from separating the roles.356 
Business leaders have also expressed concern about 
duality and have voiced their support for the nonexecutive 
Chair role. Harold Geneen, former chairman of International 
Telephone & Telegraph, believes that the board’s role is to 
judge the performance of the company’s management, 
especially the CEO.357 Mr. Geneen opposes duality on the basis 
that the CEO, as the chief professional manager for the 
company, should not also assume the leadership position on the 
board because the CEO “cannot represent the shareholders and 
impartially sit in judgment on himself.”358 Similarly, Carl Icahn, 
a prominent financier, views the weakness in board oversight 
as a contributing factor to the recent economic crisis, and one of 
his suggestions for board reform is to separate the roles of the 
CEO and the board Chair.359 Compaq Computer’s former 
chairman, Benjamin Rosen, opines that when the CEO also 
serves as the board Chair, “[c]hecks and balances have been 
thrown to the wind.”360 Robert Monks, a venture capitalist and a 
director of numerous public companies, states it even more 
harshly: “You’re really talking about, when you have a 
combined chairman and C.E.O., a dictatorship.”361 
Many shareholders have voiced their preference for 
splitting the top leadership positions. Mutual funds, pension 
funds, other institutional shareholders, and shareholder 
activists have frequently lobbied for companies to adopt and 
implement governance policies that separate the positions of 
CEO and board Chair.362 For example, the United Shareholders’ 
Association, the New York City Employees Retirement System, 
Ram Trust Services, and the California Public Employees’ 
Retirement System have submitted shareholder proposals to 
  
 356 Id. 
 357 Kesner et al., supra note 6, at 790. 
 358 Rechner & Dalton 1991 Study, supra note 286, at 155. 
 359 Cheffins, supra note 30, at 54-55. 
 360 Jones & Kim, supra note 110. 
 361 Dashka Slater, Resolved: Public Corporations Shall Take Us Seriously, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2007 (Magazine), at 22. 
 362 Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 2, 54; Brickley et al., supra note 25, 
at 190; MILLSTEIN REPORT, supra note 32, at 15; Stevenson, supra note 32; 
Sundaramurthy et al., supra note 20, at 233; Worrell et al., supra note 18, at 500. 
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urge the boards of directors of large public companies, such as 
General Motors, Sears, and Exxon-Mobil, to require that an 
outside director serve as the chairperson of the board.363 These 
shareholders view the separation of the CEO and Chair 
positions as a good governance practice that signals the board’s 
ability and willingness to control management and protect 
shareholder interests.364 
Shareholder proposals to split the CEO and Chair 
positions have received increasing support from shareholders 
in recent years, and although nonbinding on the board of 
directors, these shareholder resolutions have been successful in 
pressuring some companies to split the positions.365 At 
Washington Mutual, for example, the board of directors decided 
in 2008 to replace CEO Kerry Killinger as chairman of the 
board in response to a majority vote by shareholders to 
separate the positions.366 Similarly, at Bank of America, CEO 
Kenneth Lewis relinquished his role as board Chair in mid-
2009 after a majority of the company’s shareholders voted in 
favor of splitting the positions.367 Later that year, CEO John 
Mackey stepped down as Chair of Whole Foods Market after 
  
 363 See Balsam & Upadhyay, supra note 25, at 54 (referencing a 2008 
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 365 See Claudia H. Deutsch, Revolt of the Shareholders, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 
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 367 Independent Board Chair, COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS (Mar. 
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years of pressure from shareholders to separate the roles of the 
chief executive and the board chair.368 
Various industry groups are supportive of splitting the 
top corporate leadership positions. The National Association of 
Corporate Directors (“NACD”), for example, identifies that one 
of the membership’s Key Agreed Principles to Strengthen 
Corporate Governance for U.S. Publicly Traded Companies is 
that corporate governance should be structured to provide 
leadership for the management group that is distinct from 
leadership for the board.369 The NACD’s guidelines for the 
composition of its own board of directors also specify that the 
“positions of Chairman of the Board and CEO are separate,” 
the “CEO may not serve as Chairman,” and the “Chairman of 
the Board shall be an independent Director.”370 Other 
organizations that have voiced their support for separating the 
top leadership roles include the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development,371 the Council of Institutional 
Investors,372 and the Millstein Center for Corporate Governance 
and Performance.373 
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Corporate governance advisers and rating services 
regard the nonexecutive Chair structure as a better governance 
structure than the CEO-Chair structure.374 These advisers and 
services provide corporate governance ratings to various 
customers, including “investors, insurance companies, financial 
and securities analysts . . . , financial institutions, and the 
rated companies themselves.”375 Customers use the ratings “to 
make investment decisions . . ., determine premiums, prepare 
financial and stock reports . . ., determine credit risks, and 
benchmark governance practices.”376 Citing the enhanced ability 
of a nonexecutive Chair to monitor management’s performance, 
the governance raters assign strong grades to companies that 
separate their CEO and Chair positions.377 
Regulators have expressed support for board reforms 
that restrict the company’s CEO from serving as board Chair.378 
Current and former commissioners of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission have spoken in favor of separating the 
positions as a means of reducing the power of the chief 
executive over the board.379 Regulators believe that the 
separation of the roles would strengthen the governance of U.S. 
corporations because the CEO’s role is to lead the management 
group and serve as its spokesperson, whereas the Chair’s role 
is to lead, and be the spokesperson for, the director group that 
oversees the management group.380 
Legislators have also promoted legislation to separate 
the CEO and Chair positions.381 In Congress, Senators Charles 
Schumer and Maria Cantwell introduced the Shareholder Bill 
of Rights Act of 2009, and Representative Gary Peters 
introduced the Shareholder Empowerment Act of 2009; both 
bills contain a provision requiring public companies to have an 
independent board chair.382 On the state front, the North 
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Dakota legislature in 2007 successfully added a corporate 
governance chapter to the state’s business corporation statute; 
one of the governance provisions prohibits the board chair from 
serving as an executive officer of the corporation.383 The North 
Dakota corporate governance chapter was adopted “to 
strengthen corporate democracy and improve the performance 
of publicly traded corporations,” and the chapter provides an 
“opt-in” mechanism in which corporations may elect to be 
subject to the governance rules of the chapter.384 
In sum, various stakeholder groups have long advocated 
for separation of the CEO and Chair positions. In the past 
decade, revelation of accounting and financial manipulation by 
chief executives at prominent companies, stock option 
backdating by senior management at hundreds of major 
corporations, and excessive risk taking by top executives at 
financial and investment institutions may have fueled the 
strong support among shareholders, business leaders, industry 
groups, corporate governance advisers, regulators, and 
legislators for more vigorous oversight of the company’s CEO 
by a separate and independent board Chair. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, as 
reflected in financial and nonfinancial metrics, weigh strongly 
in favor of a leadership structure that separates the CEO and 
Chair positions. Having a nonexecutive Chair, instead of a dual 
CEO-Chair, provides a governance framework that is better 
suited to the fulfillment of the board’s fundamental 
responsibilities to oversee business operations and monitor 
management conduct for the purpose of enhancing shareholder 
value. Furthermore, empirical evidence indicates not only that 
duality correlates with lower board performance and 
shareholder value, but also that the negative effects of duality 
cannot be eliminated simply by putting more outside directors 
on the board or by installing a lead director. 
The recognition that board performance and corporate 
success do not depend solely on whether the positions of CEO 
and Chair are held by one or two individuals does not preclude 
  
 383 N.D. CORP. GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF THE NORTH DAKOTA 
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 384 Id. at 1.  
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the conclusion that the nonexecutive Chair structure is better 
than the duality CEO-Chair structure for fulfilling directorial 
responsibility and enhancing shareholder value. Not every 
company that combines the CEO and Chair positions is a 
governance failure, and not every company that separates the 
CEO and Chair positions is a model of good governance. It 
should be noted, however, that a substantial majority of the 
companies that were at the heart of the recent economic 
meltdown had a combined CEO-Chair structure before the 
crisis erupted.385 As these financial institutions struggled over 
the past couple of years, many have voluntarily changed their 
leadership structure by electing a nonexecutive Chair.386 Thus, 
although many variables affect the board’s ability to perform 
its management and monitoring functions and the 
corporation’s ability to generate shareholder value, both 
conceptual reasons and empirical evidence point to duality as a 
governance variable that is correlated with lower board 
performance and poorer corporate financial health. So, while 
there is no guarantee that separating the leadership positions 
alone will result in an effective board or strong financial 
results, splitting the roles will give the company a better 
chance of achieving vigilant board oversight and corporate 
financial success. 
The lack of guarantee that separating the roles will 
bring governance and financial benefit to all companies 
suggests that perhaps this split leadership structure should not 
be imposed on all companies. In smaller, private companies 
where the CEO and Chair is the majority shareholder, or 
where there are controlling shareholders, there is effectively no 
separation of control and ownership, and the potential agency 
cost is minimal. Separation of the executive and board 
leadership roles in such companies is unlikely to enhance board 
performance or advance shareholder interests. Thus, the 
conclusion that companies should separate their CEO and 
Chair positions is reserved for larger, public companies.  
A thorough analysis of which, if any, regulatory bodies 
or other institutions should be charged with implementing and 
enforcing the nonexecutive Chair structure is beyond the scope 
of this article. Only a few thoughts about this question are 
presented here for potential further discussion elsewhere. If we 
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are to move beyond the current system where companies are 
permitted to choose the leadership structure that they want, 
there are various potential approaches to enforcing a 
separation of the CEO and Chair positions. State legislatures 
are generally regarded as the primary source of rules on 
corporate governance,387 and they may establish the 
nonexecutive Chair requirement in the states’ corporate 
statutes. Implementing the desired leadership structure 
through state statutes, though, is unlikely to be achieved easily 
or quickly, and the task may be more quickly accomplished and 
uniformly applied through federal laws or stock market listing 
standards.388 As discussed elsewhere in this article, many 
countries around the world have rules that prohibit 
corporations from having one individual hold both jobs of CEO 
and board Chair. Slightly different from the strict requirement 
of independent board leadership is the “comply or explain” 
system that exists in the United Kingdom and Canada.389 The 
nonexecutive Chair structure is not a novel or untested model 
of corporate leadership, and the evidence and analysis 
presented in this article suggest that we make independent 
board leadership the default corporate governance structure in 
the United States. 
There are limits to what the proposed structural change 
in corporate leadership can accomplish.390 Understanding the 
limitation, however, does not diminish the significance of the 
benefits that this change may bring. Concentrating executive 
and board leadership in one person magnifies the opportunity 
for abuse; dispersing these powers reduces the potential for 
such behavior. Separating the CEO and Chair positions also 
signals the board’s recognition and willingness to exercise its 
monitoring responsibilities. Even if such a signal is more 
symbolic than real, adopting the nonexecutive Chair structure 
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may be a highly effective way for the company to recognize the 
stakeholders’ voices. In light of the ample evidence that duality 
correlates with lower financial performance, acceding to the 
stakeholders’ call to separate the roles may soothe the anger 
being voiced against corporate leaders—even if it will not 
restore the financial loss that the investing public has suffered. 
Thus, although splitting the CEO and Chair positions is no 
panacea for the corporate ailments with which we have become 
familiar, it would not be a meaningless exercise. It would 
increase the odds of getting the best from the board and the 
management, both of which are entrusted with creating real 
economic value and achieving optimal business performance. 
